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VIET NAM'S FIRST MODERN PENAL CODE
JOHN QUIGLEY*
Our people are in the first stage of the transition period. So-
cialist construction is taking place in our country against a
very complicated international situation. The country is con-
fronting many serious difficulties. The struggle between the
socialist and capitalist roads is intense, and the struggle be-
tween ourselves and the enemy is also very fierce. The relics
of the old societies have yet to be wiped out completely.'
With these words, the Communist Party of Viet Nam called for
public discussion of Viet Nam's draft penal code. The Socialist Repub-
lic of Viet Nam Code (the "Code"), enacted by the National Assembly
of Viet Nam in 1985,1 is the first penal code to be in force throughout
* John Quigley is a Professor of the College of Law, Ohio State University. He is
grateful to Dr. Nguyen Phuong-Khanh, Senior Legal Specialist, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., for documentation and consultation; to Dean Stephen B. Young,
Hamline University School of Law; to Stephen Denney, Indochina Studies Project, Insti-
tute of East Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley; to the S.R.V. Permanent
Mission to the United Nations; to the Viet Nam Lawyers Association; and to numerous
individual members of that Association who facilitated the author's study of Vietnamese
penal law during his stays in Vietnam in 1978 and 1979. He is indebted to Andrea
Panaritis, then of the Indochina Project, Washington, D.C., for providing Code drafts;
and to Ilene Cohn, J.D. 1985, Ohio State University, for extensive research in, and analy-
sis of, Vietnamese penal law.
1. Editorial, Nhan Dan, Nov. 8, 1984, translated into English in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Vietnam, Nov. 19, 1984, at K7.
2. The S.R.V. Code was adopted by the Seventh National Assembly of the Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam, Ninth Session, June 27, 1985 [hereinafter CODE]. It entered into
force Jan. 1, 1986. It was published in the newspaper Nhan Dan, July 12, 15, 16, 17,
1985, from which it was translated into English in Vietnam: S.R. V. Criminal Code, Joint
Publications Research Service, Southeast Asia Report, JPRS-SEA-85-135, Sept. 3, 1985.
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the territory of Viet Nam since the nineteenth century. It is the prod-
uct of a history that has seen Viet Nam's penal legislation adopted by
or under the influence of two foreign states-China and France. The
period since 1975 is the first time in which Viet Nam has been in a
position to enact legislation of its own choosing. Because of this his-
tory, drafters of the 1985 penal code had no definite moorings in devis-
ing its form and content.
The Code is also the first code in any field of law to be enacted by
the government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (the "S.R.V.").
It is thus the first code of any kind for the entire country of Viet Nam
since the nineteenth century. As the first S.R.V. code, it sets a pattern
for other codes planned to follow, including criminal procedure and
civil law codes.
The Code is in the continental style, and it draws heavily on the
penal legislation of socialist countries. At the same time, it addresses
the contemporary situation of Viet Nam. This article explores the mo-
tivation and philosophy behind the Code and seeks to place it within
the complex historical and political context within which its drafters
worked. In so doing, it draws extensively on the drafters' explanation.
This Article analyzes: (1) the Code's historical antecedents in Viet
Nam; (2) the reasons for its adoption; (3) its definition of an offense;
(4) its abolition of punishment by analogy; (5) detention permitted
outside the Code; (6) types of punishment permitted in the Code; (7)
outside influences on the Code; and, finally, (8) the Code's treatment of
offenses against the state; (9) offenses related to the socialist economy;
and (10) other acts punishable as crimes under the Code.
I. ANTECEDENTS OF THE S.R.V. CODE IN VIETNAMESE PENAL LAW
Vietnamese penal law has developed under strong foreign influ-
ence, first from China, and later from France. It began independent
development only after 1945.
For an English translation, with introduction, see Phuong-Khanh, 13 REV. OF SOCIALIST
L. 103 (1987); for a French translation of the Special Part see Trinh Ho Thi & Cu Dinh
Lo, 1 BULL. DE DROIT 38 (1986), a journal of the Viet Nam Lawyers Association. A
French translation of the draft version of the General Part appears in I BULL.
D'INFORMATION JURIDIQUE 86 (1983). (This is the former name of the BULL. DE DROIT of
the Viet Nam Lawyers Association). Code language quoted in this article represents the
author's translation from the French translation.
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A. Vietnamese Penal Legislation to 1945
The 1985 code is the first penal code adopted for the entire coun-
try of Viet Nam since the 1812 code of Emperor Gia Long of the
Nguyen Dynasty (1802-1945). The Gia Long Code covered many fields
of law. Its penal provisions were a "faithful copy of China's Ch'ing
Code,"' representing "a conscious effort at imitation. '4 The Gia Long
Code followed closely the Code of China's Ch'ing Dynasty, both in con-
tent and structure.8 Like the Ch'ing Code, the Gia Long Code attrib-
uted little significance to mens rea, focusing instead on harm caused.
Also, in imitation of the Ch'ing Code, the Gia Long Code contained
elaborate distinctions in theft and homicide on the basis of the familial
relationship between perpetrator and victim.'
Viet Nam's only prior major code, the Hong Duc Code of 1483, of
the Le Dynasty (1428-1788), drew heavily from the Chinese codes of
the T'ang and Ming Dynasties.' China controlled Viet Nam (then con-
sisting of what is now the extreme northern portion only) from the
second century B.C.E., formally annexing it in 111 B.C.E. It was gov-
erned by China for the next thousand years as China's province of
Giao Chi. The Chinese government called it An Nam, meaning "paci-
fied south." Chinese-style government, through a bureaucracy adminis-
tered by mandarins, was instituted during this period.'
In 939 C.E., Viet Nam overthrew Chinese rule but remained a trib-
utary, rendering payments for investiture of Viet Nam's rulers by
China's emperor.' Nevertheless, Viet Nam retained Chinese-style
government.
After France colonized Viet Nam in the late nineteenth century, 0
it introduced three penal codes-one in each of the three sectors into
which it divided Viet Nam-Cochinchina (south)," Annam (center), 2
3. Tai, Vietnam's Code of the Le Dynasty (1428-1788), 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 523, 525
(1982).
4. M. HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA 80 (1978).
5. Id. at 86-89. Mau, Introducci6n al Derecho Vietnamita, REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO DE
DERECHO COMPARADO (Barcelona), no. 22-23, at 38, 40 (1964).
6. M. HOOKER, supra note 4, at 89-91.
7. Tai, supra note 3, at 525.
8. R. JUMPER & M. NORMAND, Vietnam, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA 375-76 (G. McTurnan Kahin ed. 1964).
9. M. HOOKER, supra note 4, at 94.
10. On Viet Nam's status as a colony of France, see NGUYEN HUU TRU, QUELQUES
PROBLIMES DE SUCCESSION D'ETATS CONCERNANT LE VIET-NAM 43 (1970).
11. MODIFIED PENAL CODE, Dec. 31, 1912, which remained in force until 1972; see also
Mau, supra note 5, at 56.
12. HOANG-VIET CRIMINAL CODE, Decree No. 43 (1933); see also Mau, supra note 5, at
19881
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and Tonkin (north).1 3 These codes were modeled on France's penal
code.14 "The Indochinese legal system was clearly part of the French
state system." 16
B. Vietnamese Penal Legislation 1945-1985
At the end of Japan's World War II occupation in 1945, the gov-
ernment of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (the "D.R.V.")
emerged in the north of Viet Nam. As a result of warfare in Viet Nam,
from that time until 1975, the D.R.V. enacted no comprehensive legis-
lation in any field. It instituted some penal legislation, though not a
comprehensive code. As for institutions of justice, despite continuing
hostilities, it "in relatively short order, succeeded in establishing the
basis of a modernized legal edifice in the country."'" In 1954 the area it
controlled became fixed by a demarcation line following the 17th
parallel.
South of the 17th parallel, the government of the Republic of Viet
Nam came into being after 1954, replacing the French administration.
It continued to use the French code until it adopted a new code in
1972 which was in force only until 1975, when the Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government (the "P.R.G.") assumed power in the south. The
P.R.G. enacted a set of penal laws in March 1976.11
A National Assembly for the entire country met for the first time
in July 1976 and established a unified government called the Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam."s Thereafter, D.R.V. legislation was applied
throughout Viet Nam. Between 1976 and 1985, the S.R.V. government
enacted a number of penal laws on particular topics.'9
13. CODE OF 1917, revised in 1921; see also Mau, supra note 5, at 56.
14. Mau, supra note 5, at 56; see also N. Huy & T. TAI, 1 THE LE CODE: LAW IN
TRADITIONAL VIETNAM, A COMPARATIVE SINO-VIETNAMESE LEGAL STUDY WITH HISTORICAL-
JURIDICAL ANALYSIS AND ANNOTATIONS 31 (1987).
15. NGUYEN Huu TRU, supra note 10, at 46.
16. Ginsburgs, The Genesis of the People's Procuracy in the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, 5 REV. SOCIALIST L. 187, 200 (1979).
17. REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM CRIMINAL CODE, Decree-Law No. 026-20-12-1972,
Dec. 20, 1972. Decree of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, March 15, 1976,
reprinted in part in KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, Aug. 20, 1976, at 27895.
18. LA RiPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTE DU VIET NAM: STRUCTURES ET FONDEMENTS (Docu-
MENTS DE LA PREMIIRE SESSION DE L'ASSEMBLOkE NATIONALE DU VIET NAM RgUNIFIE - JUIN-
JUILLETr 1976) 5 (1976).
19. See, e.g., Law on Punishing Persons Engaged in Speculation, Smuggling, Produc-
ing Fake Goods or Illegal Business, June 30, 1982, reprinted in Nhan Dhan, July 13-
14, 1982 and in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Vietnam, July 20, 1982, at K4;
Law on Punishment for Bribery Offenses, May 23, 1981, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast
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Work began in 1976 on drafting a penal code. The Council of Min-
isters appointed a drafting committee, composed of representatives of
a number of government ministries and of several citizen and profes-
sional organizations such as the Viet Nam Confederation of Trade Un-
ions, Viet Nam Women's Union, Communist Youth Union, and Viet
Nam Lawyers Association. Drafts were considered by the National As-
sembly and its Judiciary Committee, beginning in 1982,20 and were cir-
culated widely for public discussion.2" The National Assembly adopted
the Code on June 24, 1985. Thus, the immediate predecessors to the
1985 Penal Code are the penal legislation of the Democratic Republic
of Viet Nam, and a smattering of S.R.V. penal legislation which was
adopted following the formation of that government in 1976.
Until 1955 the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam continued to use
the French codes. A 1945 decree specified:
Pending the promulgation of legal codes for all of Viet Nam,
all actual legislative texts still in force in North, Central and
South Vietnam are provisionally maintained, when not con-
trary to the provisions laid down in the present decree. Pend-
ing the promulgation of such codes any urgent change will be
made by decree.22
This meant that the three French codes remained in force in the areas
under control of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. A caveat re-
garding use of the French codes was introduced by Article 12 of the
Decree: "Articles of old legislative texts provisionally kept by the pre-
sent decree are only applicable if not contrary to the principle of Viet
Information Service, Vietnam, May 28, 1981, at K4; Military Obligation Law discussed
in Editorial, Scrupulously Implement the Law on Military Service, Nhan Dhan,
July 7, 1982, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Vietnam,
July 14, 1982, at K5.
20. Report to National Assembly on drafting of the penal code by Nguyen Huu Tru,
General Secretary of the Council of Ministers, June 23, 1982, reprinted in Nhan Dan,
June 25, 1982, translated into English under the title National Assembly Hears Report
on Penal Code, Foreign Broadcast. Information Service, Vietnam, July 20, 1982, at K2.
21. Directive of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers
Party urging discussion in state agencies and social organizations, reported by Hanoi
Domestic Service, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Vietnam,
Nov. 19, 1984, at K6.
22. D.R.V. Decree No. 47, Oct. 10, 1945, art. 1; see also Huong, Penal Law in AN
OUTLINE OF INSTITUTIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM 185, 192 (1974),
English translation of APERCU SUR LES INSTITUTIONS DE LA R9:PUBLIQUE DIkMOCRATIQUE DU
VIET NAM (1972); I. ANDREEV, OCHERK PO UGOLOVNOMY PRAVU SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH
GOSUDARSTV [Outline of the Criminal Law of Socialist States] 28 (1978), a Russian trans-
lation and revision of I. ANDREJEW, ZARYS PRAWA KARNEGO PANSTW SOCJALISTYCZNYCH
(1975).
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Nam's independence and to the democratic republican regime."28 The
D.R.V. government promulgated a number of penal enactments in its
first few years of existence.24 Finally, in 1955, use of the French codes,
including the French penal code, ended. An Instruction issued by the
Ministry of Justice, June 30, 1955, indicated:
The old legislation can no longer serve as a juridical basis for
popular tribunals to determine infringements, in any case
whatsoever .... When a new text is available it must be ap-
plied .... If there are only provisions of the old penal code at
hand, no reference should be made to them. In the latter case,
the tribunal has to base itself on general directives concerning
trial and judgment, on general requirements concerning the
kind of matters to be judged and concrete requirements of the
case under consideration.2"
While no governmental decree appears to have been issued to ter-
minate the effect of the French code, the People's Supreme Court fol-
lowed the Ministry's Instruction. In a directive of July 10, 1959, the
Court stated:
[I]n Viet Nam's present situation articles of law adopted under
imperialist and feudalist oppression should not be applied even
in a new spirit. To judge civil and penal cases, reference should
be made to the legislation of the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam (laws, decrees, circulars, circular No. 556), the Party's po-
litical line, the government's policy, [and] the People's Su-
preme Court rulings. In case no solution can be reached a
report should be made to the People's Supreme Court for its
views."6
In 1967 and 1970 decrees were adopted defining certain categories of
crime: counter-revolutionary crimes, crimes against socialist ownership,
and crimes against personal ownership.27 These were elaborate decrees,
23. Huong, supra note 22, at 192.
24. Id. at 193; see also I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 28-29.
25. Huong, supra note 22, at 194; see also I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 29.
26. Huong, supra note 22, at 194.
27. Decree-Law, Oct. 30, 1967, "On the Repression of Counter-Revolutionary
Crimes," English translation, reprinted in Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS
No. 45611, CA 106, at 103-10 (1967), and in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Vi-
etnam, Oct. 23, 1979, at Ki, re-published in Nhan Dan, Oct. 16, 1979; Decree-Law,
Oct. 21, 1970, "On the Repression of Infringements on Socialist Property"; Decree-Law,
Oct. 21, 1970, "On the Repression of Infringements of the Private Property of Citizens"
(French translations of the three statutes were made available to the author by the Viet
Nam Lawyers Association).
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phrased like provisions of a penal code.
C. Role of Supreme Court in Defining Crimes
In addition to these decrees, there also appeared directives of the
People's Supreme Court concerning certain offenses. The Court issued
these directives pursuant to a power granted it in the Law on the Or-
ganization of the Popular Tribunals of July 26, 1960 to "guide lower
people's tribunals in the application of laws, of the political line, and of
procedure."2 8
The Court was quite active in issuing such directives, many of
which elucidated general principles of penal law, such as intent, age of
criminal responsibility, complicity, the aims of criminal punishment,
deprivation of certain rights, and sentencing on multiple convictions.2 9
Other directives dealt with particular offenses, either further defining
offenses provided for by D.R.V. legislation, or acting, in effect, as a
substitute for legislation. Directives were issued concerning looting,
theft, embezzlement, breach of trust, swindling of socialist property,
poor management of socialist property, moonshining, speculation, and
crimes against the person."0 These directives were explained to lower
court judges at annual meetings held by the People's Supreme Court.
They also served as a basis for drafting legislation."
II. REASONS FOR ADOPTION OF THE CODE
The lack of broad-scope penal legislation was recognized as unde-
sirable in a 1955 instruction of the Council of Ministers:
[T]he diversity in court practice in different regions has re-
sulted in a situation in which the methods of case considera-
tion are not precise and correct, and in certain regions they do
not comply with published rules. Therefore it is necessary to
generalize this court practice by publishing a single enactment
that indicates how punishments are to be imposed for different
criminal offenses.
32
No code was enacted, however, prior to that of 1985.
28. Law on the Organization of People's Tribunals, July 26, 1960, art. 21 (French
translation was made available to the author by the Viet Nam Lawyers Association).
29. Huong, supra note 22, at 195.
30. Id. at 195-96.
31. Id. at 196. On the desirability of a code, see id. at 193, 207.
32. Circular No. 442, D.R.V. Council of Ministers, Jan. 19, 1955, reprinted in I. AN-
DREEV, supra note 22, at 28-29.
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The preamble to the 1985 Code recites that "[t]his penal code .is a
continuation and development of the criminal laws applied by our
state since the August revolution. It sums up the experiences of our
country in the struggle against and prevention of infractions over the
past few decades, while providing for future infractions." 3 The influ-
ence of D.R.V. legislation is evident in the Code.
The aim behind adoption of a code is to bring the law into line
with the current situation of Viet Nam and to fill gaps in existing legis-
lation. Phan Hien, S.R.V. Minister of Justice, referring to the D.R.V.
statutes, said that "some of them are no longer suitable. Besides, no
ordinances have been enacted with regard to a large number of of-
fenses, and the policy of the State in the field of criminal law is not yet
comprehensive. ' '"I He further stated:
The legislative texts of penal law promulgated from 1945 to the
present . . . are all in the form of separate laws, each aimed
only at certain offenses or groups of offenses. That is why they,
at a general level, are not systematic, in some areas they lack
unity, and they do not provide for all offenses. Some of them
are not in keeping with the needs of the present situation."8
The individual penal statutes provided, moreover, few articles typically
found in the general part of a penal code to resolve issues applicable to
all specific offenses.
Phan Hien also sees a penal code as useful for attaining economic
and social objectives:
[T]he promulgation of a penal code.., will assist in the fulfill-
ment of our two strategic tasks (to build socialism and defend
our socialist homeland), our three revolutions (revolution in
production relations, scientific and technological revolution,
and ideological and cultural revolution), and in the safeguard-
ing of Party leadership, the people's right to collective mastery,
and effective administration by the State. 6
33. CODE, supra note 2, preamble, para. 3.
34. Hien, The Penal Code of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, VIETNAM COURIER,
no. 9, at 4 (1985).
35. Hien, Le Code Pnal de la R~publique Socialiste du Vietnam, 1 BULL. DE DROIT
18 (1986).
36. Hien, supra note 34, at 4.
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III. THE CODE'S DEFINITION OF A PUNISHABLE OFFENSE
The S.R.V. Code, in the tradition of codes of socialist states,3 7 de-
fines an offense in a dual fashion-from its formal aspect and from its
material aspect. This is done in Article 8. That article first defines an
offense as an act forbidden by the Code. This is the formal aspect. But
it further defines an offense in its material aspect, namely, by specify-
ing the social interests infringed by an offense. Article 8, paragraph 1,
reads:
An offense is a socially dangerous act provided for in the pre-
sent Code, whether committed intentionally or not, by a person
capable of penal responsibility, that threatens the indepen-
dence, sovereignty, unity, or territorial integrity of the country,
that threatens the socialist state system, that threatens eco-
nomic institutions or socialist property, that threatens the life,
health, property, liberty, honor, dignity, or other fundamental
rights of citizens, or that threatens other aspects of the social-
ist legal order."8
The Soviet codes,s" like the S.R.V. Code, identify, in their definition of
the concept of crime, the social interests protected by penal law. Some
socialist codes omit such a listing but all include the characterization
of crime as "socially dangerous."40
In contrast, Western European penal codes typically define an of-
fense from the formal aspect only-as an act provided for in the code.
They do not refer to its socially dangerous character or to interests
threatened by it."1
37. "Socialist state" is used to designate states governed by a communist party es-
pousing a historical materialist analysis; see infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
38. CODE, supra note 2, art. 8, para. 1.
39. Reference will be made throughout to "Soviet codes," as in the USSR, structured
as a federation. Penal legislation is found in a code for each of the fifteen republics that
constitute the federation. While some provisions are enacted by the federation and re-
produced in the republic codes, most are formulated at the republic level. Frequent ref-
erence will be made to the Ugolovnii Kodeks RSFSR [hereinafter UK RSFSR], which is
the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, one of the fifteen
constituent republics. The fifteen Soviet penal codes reflect substantial similarity with
each other.
40. Horvath, The Concept of Crime: Categories of Criminal Acts, in SOVREMENNYE
TENDENTSII RAZVITIIA SOTSIALISTICHESKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA [Contemporary Tendencies
in the Development of Socialist Criminal Law] 12, 14-18 (V. Kudriavtsev ed. 1983); see
also I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 56.
41. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 58; see also Pomorski, Communists and Their
Criminal Law: Reflections on Igor Andrejew's "Outline of the Criminal Law of Socialist
States," 7 REv. SOCIALIST L. 7, 16 (1981).
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Inclusion of the material element in the definition of crime serves
three functions: 1) public education; 2) limiting crime to situations
where social danger exists; and 3) portraying crime as a threat to a
particular social class.
A. Public Education
Inclusion of the material element stresses to the public the reason
why the legislature has chosen the acts included in the Special Part;
those acts threaten the enumerated interests. The inclusion thus has
the intended impact of convincing the public to obey the law by ex-
plaining the importance of the interests protected. As stated by one
socialist jurist:
[O]ne must remember the educational and prevention role of
the general concept of crime. It consists in the fact that citi-
zens, on the basis of the indicators included in this concept,
receive a conception about what kinds of acts are considered
by the law to be negative. Thus a correct definition of crime
exerts a positive force on formation of the ethical system of
values of the citizens. "2
This function of law as it should operate under socialism was identified
by the Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, who saw in the
carrying out of a legal norm a propagation by those obeying it of the
validity of the norm."3
"[T]he aim of the Penal Code" is said to be "not only to punish,
but also to educate.""" The Code here follows socialist penal codes,
which assume a role of educating the citizenry in values that must be
held if society is to progress through the state of socialism to that of
communism.45 This public education aim is not new to Vietnamese law.
A 1960 D.R.V. statute on the courts stated that "the activities of the
people's courts has as an aim the education of citizens in a spirit of
loyalty to the country, to the people's democratic system, respect for
public property, observance of laws, labor discipline, and the rules of
life in society."4 6
The government actively uses legal documents like the penal code
42. Horvath, supra note 40, at 15.
43. Cain, Gram.sci, the State and the Place of Law, in LEGALITY, IDEOLOGY AND THE
STATE 95, 102-03 (D. Sugarman ed. 1983).
44. Minh, La Partie Gn~rale du Code Pgnal Vietnamien, 1 BULL. D' INFORMATION
JURIDIQUE 58, 62 (1983).
45. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR. AN INTERPRETATION OF SovIET LAW 282-84
(1963). On the historical stages, see infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
46. Law on the Organization of People's Tribunals, supra note 28, art. 1, para. 4.
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in public education work. In 1982, Justice Minister Phan Hien directed
Ministry personnel to disseminate information to the public about new
legal texts and to use the penal code then in draft form:
Legal propaganda 47 and education is an important work ....
Try to do properly the work of making propaganda about the
new legal documents dealing with organization of the state ma-
chinery, the regulation on considering complaints, the military
obligation law and the laws about market management and the
protection of socialist properties and security and social order.
Get prepared for making propaganda about the criminal
code."8
B. Limiting Character of Material Element
Inclusion of the material element limits application of the Code to
those acts that threaten the enumerated interests and that are socially
dangerous. An offense is defined, in a technical sense, not only by the
words used in a particular provision of the Special Part, e.g., use of
force or threat thereof to obtain socialist property,49 but also by the
socially dangerous quality of the act and by the fact that it threatens
one of the enumerated interests-in this example, socialist ownership.
This means that an act is not an offense if, though it constitutes
the act as defined in the Special Part, it is not socially dangerous. This
could be the case because in the particular situation there was social
utility to the act, or because the degree of social danger was minimal.50
The latter possibility is provided for in most socialist penal codes,5'
including the S.R.V. Code. Article 8, para. 3 provides: "Although con-
taining the elements of an offense, acts representing insignificant social
danger shall not be considered as such but shall be handled by other
means."
In another article, the Code provides for exemption from criminal
liability if an act, while socially dangerous at the time of its commis-
sion, has lost that character prior to trial "as [a] result of a change in
the situation" that renders either the act or the suspect non-
dangerous.15
47. "Propaganda" is used in a non-perjorative sense to indicate propagation of
knowledge.
48. Circular No. 3831/TP, Ministry of Justice, June 11, 1982, reprinted in PHAP CHE
XA Hoi CHU NGHIA, Apr.-June 1982, no. 2, at 8.
49. CODE, supra note 2, art. 129.
50. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 58-60.
51. Horvath, supra note 40, at 21.
52. CODE, supra note 2, art. 48, para. 1.
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In prosecution of criminal cases, the socially dangerous character
of an act is at least prima facie assumed from the fact that the act
contains the elements of the offense as defined in the Special Part. The
prosecution does not bear a burden of presenting evidence of an act's
socially dangerous character."3 If the judges or the accused raise the
issue, then the burden of persuasion rests on the prosecution to prove
social dangerousness.
C. Historical-Materialist Character of Material Element
Inclusion of the material element also places the penal code in the
context of the social order in which it operates. The several references
to socialism indicate that the purpose of the code is to protect the so-
cialist social order. These references are a product of the historical ma-
terialist philosophy underlying the socialist penal codes. "[T]he idea of
the material content of crime connects the concept of criminal law with
the principles of historical materialism." 4
Penal law, in a historical materialist analysis, protects the order of
a particular society. Historical materialism views society as passing
through stages, beginning with a non-state order, labelled primitive
communism. With the emergence of private ownership of productive
goods, a state develops, and it uses law, penal law included, to protect
the social order based on private ownership. 5 "[I]n any social-eco-
nomic formation an act declared a crime in the final analysis threatens
the interests of the ruling class."
56
In the first historical stage so identified, slave-holding society, pe-
nal law protected the property of the slave owners. In the second stage,
feudalism, penal law protected the property of the feudal lords. In the
third stage, capitalism, penal law protected the property of the
bourgeoisie.
After overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the working class exercises a
dictatorship over the bourgeoisie. During that period, penal law pro-
tects the working class. Then commences a period in which the state
no longer represents an identifiable class but all of society. This stage
is "developed socialism"-where socialism has been achieved and the
society is transforming itself in the direction of communism, a society
in which government and law disappear because the lack of class divi-
sion removes the need for law as a mechanism of domination:
53. Horvath, supra note 40, at 23.
54. 1. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 56.
55. See generally F. ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
STATE (1972).
56. Horvath, supra note 40, at 13.
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Recognition of a particular act as criminal in the period of
transition from capitalism to socialism in a socialist state is de-
termined by the interests of the working class and of all work-
ers, and in the period of transition from socialist to commu-
nism by the interests of the entire people, who are building
communist society under the leadership of the working class.""
In the stage of "developed socialism," socialist jurists argue, penal law
remains class-based. But that concept loses significance because there
is no longer a division of society into classes:
In developed socialist society criminal law retains its class
character. Its task is protection of the state, social and eco-
nomic order, [and] defense of the interests and rights of all cit-
izens from socially dangerous infringement. The class essence
of crime continues. Crime in developed socialist society, where
there are no antagonistic classes, where there is found a close
link, a commonality of basic interests of the working class and
of all working people, is in the full sense of the word "an act
dangerous for society," and not simply an act dangerous for the
interests of the ruling class. 8
Drafters of the S.R.V. Code operate within the historical material-
ist tradition. They view Viet Nam as not having achieved "developed
socialism" but as remaining at the stage of dictatorship of the proleta-
riat over the bourgeoisie: "It [the Code] must be the effective instru-
ment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, contributing to guarantee-
ing Party direction, the working people's right of collective mastery,
and the efficiency of state administration."" "Within the exploiting
state," writes Phan Hien, "crimes are actions that disrupt the social
order established by the exploiting classes; progressive, revolutionary
actions are considered crimes."60 Referring to Viet Nam, he identifies
five categories of interests that penal prohibitions protect: 1) the inde-
pendence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the fatherland;
2) the socialist state system; 3) the socialist economic system and so-
cialist ownership; 4) the life, health, property, freedom, honor, dignity
and other fundamental rights of the citizens; and 5) other fields of so-
cialist legal order."
57. A. PIONTKOVSKII, 2 KURS SOVETSKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA [Course in Soviet Crimi-
nal Law] 26 (1970).
58. Horvath, supra note 40, at 13.
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IV. ABOLITION OF PUNISHMENT BY ANALOGY
One major change over prior law is the Code's abandonment of
punishment by analogy. That principle had permitted characterization
of an act not prohibited by legislation as a crime, if the court found the
act socially dangerous. Punishment was pronounced under an "analo-
gous" criminal statute.
The Code abolishes punishment by analogy by requiring that only
acts prohibited by the Code shall be offenses. Article 2 recites: "Only
offenders of the crimes stipulated in the penal code are subject to pe-
nal responsibility.""2 Article 8 defines an offense as an act that, inter
alia, is "provided for in the present Code." 3
Professor Nguyen Ngoc Minh, Director of the Insitute of Law, ex-
plained the reason for use of analogy in Viet Nam: "It is quite under-
standable for a country that had to struggle endlessly against aggres-
sion and a thousand other hostile acts of the enemy, against the
sometimes bloody reaction of the overthrown exploiting classes while
the system of legislation was not yet sufficiently elaborated.""' He said,
however, analogy is no longer required in Viet Nam:
But now the situation is quite different. The socialist system is
consolidated, the country is reunified, the struggle against
crime over the past forty years has given important results and
brought valuable experience. The new constitution and many
laws and ordinances have been promulgated, which has permit-
ted this relatively elaborate codification that corresponds to
the needs of the present situation and that of the years to
come. In these conditions, maintenance of the principle of
analogy is no longer necessary. 5
Phan Hien further explained that analogy carried dangers to the rights
of accused persons:
[T]he General Part specifies clearly that an offense must be
provided for in the Penal Code. Thus, the principle of analogy
is formally excluded from penal law. Previously, since the law
had not provided for all offenses, the courts were authorized to
apply, in certain cases, the principle of analogy. That was nec-
essary for the struggle against criminality but could lead to ar-
bitrariness threatening the right of collective mastery of the
62. CODE, supra note 2, art. 2. This article is cited as having the effect of abolishing
analogy. Minh, supra note 44, at 63.
63. CODE, supra note 2, art. 8.
64. Minh, supra note 44, at 63.
65. Id.
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people. Since the Penal Code foresees all offenses, it is rational
to abandon the principle of analogy and thus to conform to the
principle of socialist legality.""
In its report on the Code, the S.R.V. Council of Ministers also ex-
plained why analogy was being abolished: "The abolition of the princi-
ple of analogy is in keeping with progressive tendencies in law through-
out the world, and particularly in the fraternal socialist countries. All
are unanimous in seeing in the abolition great progress in the penal
legislation of Vietnam."67
Punishment by analogy was characterized as a practice that "could
lead to arbitrariness in court trials and to violation of basic civil
rights."68 The abolition of punishment by analogy is a "new point" in
Vietnamese penal law.6 9 The Council of Ministers' report explained
that if new crimes need to be created, it will be done by the National
Assembly: "Naturally, in the future, if through evolution of the situa-
tion new offenses appear, the legislature will supplement the Code.
That is normal work for any state."7
A. Analogy in Socialist Penal Law
Viet Nam had a long tradition of using analogy in its penal law.
7 1
The Gia Long Code, like China's Ch'ing Dynasty Code, permitted pun-
ishment by analogy.7 2 The movement away from analogy is typical of
developments in the penal law of other socialist states.7 3 The USSR
used analogy until 1958: "[T]he legislation of the state that first built
socialism, in the absence of appropriate experience, could not define
precisely the scope of criminal behavior; therefore, possible gaps in
criminal law regulation had to be filled by the agencies applying the
law." 4 Of the states that subsequently became socialist in Europe,
66. Hien, supra note 35, at 20.
67. Minh, supra note 44, at 63.
68. Minh, Obshchaia chast' UK S.R. V. [The General Part of the Criminal Code of
the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam], SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [Soviet State and
Law], no. 8, 89-90 (1984).
69. Minh, supra note 44, at 62.
70. Id.
71. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA: EXEMPLIFIED BY 190 CH'ING DY-
NASTY CASES 176 (1967); see also Meijer, The New Criminal Law of the People's Repub-
lic of China, 6 REV. OF SOCIALIST L. 125, 132 (1980).
72. D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, supra note 71, at 176; see also Giovanetti, The Principle
of Analogy in Sino-Soviet Criminal Laws, 8 DALHOUSIE L.J. 382, 384-85 (1984).
73. For analysis of analogy in socialist states, see Pomorski, supra note 41, at 10-11.
74. Horvath, supra note 40, at 26.
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some never introduced analogy (Poland, German Democratic Republic,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary). "The European countries of people's de-
mocracy that began the path of socialist development after the Second
World War, relying on the experience of the Soviet Union, could work
out complete criminal-law legislation without gaps and therefore had
no need to apply analogy."" Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Ruma-
nia, however, did use analogy for the first few years after their revolu-
tions.7" Analogy has been more widely used in the Asian socialist
states, where Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
employed it for a time," and where it is still in use in the People's
Republic of China.
7 a
B. Prior Law in Viet Nam Relating to Analogy
A 1955 D.R.V. decree authorized courts to punish by analogy.79 A
number of D.R.V. penal statutes had provided that crimes of the given
category not prohibited by the enactment could be prosecuted by anal-
ogy to a prohibition contained in the enactment. For example, a de-
cree-law on counter-revolutionary crimes provided: "With regard to
counter-revolutionary crimes not foreseen in this decree-law, articles
on analogous crimes foreseen in this decree-law shall be applicable."8 0
A decree-law on crimes against socialist property provided: "As for in-
fringements of socialist property not foreseen in this decree-law, the
dispositions of this decree-law shall be applied by analogy."'" A decree-
75. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 62; see also Horvath, supra note 40, at 26.
76. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 62; see also Pomorski, supra note 41, at 11.
77. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 62; see also Pomorski, supra note 41, at 11. In
Mongolia, analogy was introduced in the penal code of 1934, continued in the penal code
of 1942, and abolished in the penal code of 1961. V. MARKELOV, UGOLOVNOE PRAVO
MONGOL'SKoI NARODNOI RESPUBLIKI [Criminal Law of the Mongolian People's Republic]
116 (1960); MONGOLIA CRIMINAL CODE art. 4 (1961), reprinted in W. BUTLER. THE
MONGOLIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTEMPORARY LEGISLATION AND DOCUMENTATION 572 (1982).
78. Pomorski, supra note 41, at 11; see also Giovanetti, supra note 72, at 396-99.
Article 79 states: "Those who commit offenses not explicitly defined in the specific provi-
sions of the present law may be convicted and sentenced according to the most approxi-
mate article in the present law. However, approval must be obtained from the Supreme
People's Court." CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 79 (1979) [here-
inafter P.R.C. CRIMINAL LAW], reprinted in 7 REV. OF SOCIALIST L. 199 (1988).
79. Decree, Government of the D.R.V., Jan. 19, 1955, CONG BAO, No. 12, item 170
(1955), reprinted in Dao Chi Uk, Ugolovnaia politika Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki Vi-
etnam [Penal Policy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam], SoVE'rSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I
PRAVO [Soviet State and Law], no. 10, at 103, 105 (1984).
80. Decree-Law, "On the Repression of Counter-Revolutionary Crimes," supra note
27, art. 21. A previous statute on counter-revolutionary crimes (Jan. 20, 1953) had also
called for punishment by analogy. Huong, supra note 22, at 201.
81. Decree-Law, "On the Repression of Infringements on Socialist Property," supra
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law on crimes against property of citizens provided: "As for infringe-
ments on a citizen's private property not foreseen in this decree-law,
the dispositions of this decree-law shall be applied by analogy.""2 A
similar analogy provision appeared in a decree-law on crimes concern-
ing economic planning."
A commentator of that period explained the need for analogy:
At the present time [19741, not only has no penal code yet been
elaborated in the D.R.V.N. but our penal legislation is still im-
perfect. Our social and economic situation is undergoing a com-
plete change because socialist transformation has not yet come
to an end and socialist construction is only just beginning. But
we could not remain powerless in face of actions which consti-
tuted great social dangers but were not expressly dealt with by
any legislative text.84
These provisions did not specify how a court was to determine
what type of act might be analogous to an act prohibited in one of the
decrees. The government's 1955 decree on analogy characterized it as
an exceptional procedure, and other legislative authorizations of anal-
ogy counseled caution in its use.8 5 Phan Hien characterized use of anal-
ogy in the D.R.V. as infrequent: "In a few cases that arose in the past,
in order to punish crimes that had not been specifically defined, it was
necessary to apply laws on crimes that were similar in nature to the
unregulated crime. "88
A need for use of analogy in the D.R.V. was obviated to a consid-
erable extent by the issuance by the People's Supreme Court of direc-
tives defining crimes. The frequency of such directives reduced the
need to define crime by analogy. In effect, the People's Supreme Court,
like English courts, defined criminal conduct through case law. Such
determinations were binding on lower courts.
1. Statutory Analogy
One authoritative commentator characterizes these statutory pro-
visions on analogy as true examples of statutory analogy (analogie de
note 27, art. 24, para. 1.
82. Decree-Law, "On the Repression of Infringements on Private Property of Citi-
zens," supra note 27, art. 20, para. 1.
83. Decree-Law, June 15, 1956, reprinted in Huong, supra note 22, at 195.
84. Huong, supra note 22, at 201.
85. Dao Chi Uk, supra note 79, at 105.
86. Hien, A New Step Forward in Drafting the Laws of Our State, TAP CHI CONG
SAN (Communist Review], no. 6, at 25 (1984).
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la lo0).8 7 While the commentator did not specify how that principle was
to be applied, that term had a fixed meaning in civil law systems and
had been applied in penal law in the USSR, until 1958.88 In the USSR
statutory analogy meant that an act could be found punishable though
not specified in a penal enactment if: 1) the act was determined to be
socially dangerous; 2) the act was not prohibited by a penal enactment;
and 3) there existed among penal enactments a provision prohibiting
an act similar by type of conduct and by degree of dangerousness.8s An
example of application of statutory analogy in Soviet law is a decree of
the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court. In that decree, a 1937 law
requiring that dwelling space be reserved for six months for a person
who departs temporarily from his family was held applicable by anal-
ogy also to a tenant sentenced to deprivation of freedom for up to six
months.90
That definition, however, does not resolve the issue neatly. The
second branch of the definition is the only one of the three that
presents no difficulty. It is included to prohibit use of analogy to pun-
ish more severely than intended by the legislature. For example, if
both theft and robbery are prohibited by penal enactments, an act of
theft could not be punished by analogy to robbery.9 1
The first and third branches of the definition do present difficulty.
How does a tribunal determine that an act is socially dangerous, and if
it makes that determination, how does it decide whether one or an-
other penal enactment is similar to it by type of offense and by degree
of dangerousness?
92
2. Analogy of Law
In addition to statutory analogy, Vietnamese courts were author-
ized to define criminal conduct via the much broader principle of anal-
ogy of law (analogie de droit).9 This principle permits analogizing not
87. Huong, supra note 22, at 201.
88. See supra text accompanying note 74.
89. 1 IURIDICHESKII SLOVAR' [Legal Dictionary] 33 (P. Kudriavtstev ed. 1956).
90. Decree of Dec. 12, 1940, reprinted in Berman, Analogy, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOVIET LAW 46 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1973).
91. IURIDICHESKII SLOVAR', supra note 89, at 33. For an argument that such raising or
penalty constituted the principal way in which analogy was applied under the Ch'ing
Code in China, see generally Quigley, Book Review, 83 HARV. L. REV. 699 (1970) (review-
ing D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA. EXEMPLIFIED BY 190 CH'ING DYNASTY
CASES (1967)).
92. A Vietnamese procurator hypothesized to the author that an act of sodomy could
be punished by analogy to a provision on sexual assault. Disagreeing, a higher procuracy
official told the author that the two acts are too dissimilar.
93. Huong, supra note 22, at 195.
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to a statute but to general principles of law. It is thus more expansive
than statutory analogy, and no similar statute need be found. Never-
theless, determining the appropriate penalty is a problem, as there is
no other statute whose penalty provision may be used.
In the USSR, analogy of law was not permitted in penal law, and
only statutory analogy was used. This was indicated by the Code arti-
cle on analogy, which stated: "If a particular socially dangerous act is
not specified directly in this Code, then the elements and limits of re-
sponsibility for it shall be determined by those articles of the Code
which specify crimes similar in kind." '9 4 A 1956 Soviet legal encyclope-
dia states that analogy of law was rarely used in the USSR (even in
civil cases) and that it was "widely used when the law [was] in [the]
process of formation, as, for example, occurred in our country during
the period of the Great October Socialist Revolution or in countries of
people's democracy at the first stage of their development." '
Thus, Vietnamese tribunals were permitted greater latitude in
fashioning new offenses than was true of Soviet tribunals under the
1927 Soviet penal legislation. However, as indicated, the use of analogy
was circumscribed by the issuance of law-defining directives by the
People's Supreme Court.
C. Significance of Use of Analogy
The significance of the existence of either type of analogy in penal
law should not be overdrawn. English penal law developed for centu-
ries primarily through judge-fashioned law, and British judges contin-
ued to define "common law" offenses. Nullum crimen, nulla poena
sine lege gained currency only with the French Revolution and emer-
gence of the concept that penal provisions should be defined by a legis-
lative body. The Danish Criminal Code, enacted in 1930, uses statutory
analogy: "Only acts punishable under a statute or acts of entirely simi-
lar nature shall be punished." '9 Interestingly, that provision is seldom
used.97 Norwegian courts have defined offenses using statutory analogy,
though the Norwegian penal code contains no provision permitting
analogy.98 Analogy was used frequently in Norway in the early years of
the Norwegian code, being invoked, for example, to punish neglect of
94. UK RSFSR art. 16 (1927).
95. IURIDICHESKII SLOVAR', supra note 89, at 33.
96. CRIMINAL CODE OF DENMARK art. 1.
97. Waaben, Criminal Law, in DANISH LAW: A GENERAL SURVEY 353 (H. Gammeltoft-
Hansen, B. Gomnard, & A. Philip eds. 1982).
98. J. ANDENAES, THE GENERAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF NORWAY 108 (1965).
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children by analogy to a statute prohibiting cruelty to animals.9
In France, which, like Norway, has no statute calling for analogy
in penal law, courts have reached decisions through statutory analogy.
In one case, a person charged with making a false report of crime to a
magistrate was convicted by analogy to Article 222 of the Penal Code,
which prohibits insults to magistrates. 00
V. DETENTION FOR RE-EDUCATION
Detention for re-education is permitted by law in Viet Nam
through processes administered outside the courts. This detention is
not considered a criminal penalty, though it may extend a number of
years. Like socialist and many European countries, Viet Nam handles
many minor offenses as "administrative" rather than "criminal," using
a non-court procedure for imposition of sanctions, typically in the form
of a fine or a few days incarceration.' 1 Less serious road traffic offenses
are an example.
Government ministries are empowered to impose on their own em-
ployees disciplinary sanctions for violation of ministry rules. Proceed-
ings are conducted by a hearing within the ministry, and penalties in-
clude confinement in a re-education camp.1
0 2
A 1961 decree of the D.R.V., still in force, permits three years de-
tention, renewable for additional periods of three years without a
stated maximum, for re-education of "counter-revolutionary elements
who have persisted in carrying culpable acts that threaten public se-
curity."' 0 3 Later in 1961, the D.R.V. Council of Ministers adopted a
99. Id. at 107.
100. R. DAVID, 2 LE DROIT FRANCAIS 312 (1960).
101. See, e.g., CODE, supra note 2, arts. 169, 170, 184, 206. Administrative sanctions
are provided for by the Statute on Administrative Sanctions, CONG BAO, No. 9, item 94
(1977), reported in Dao Chi Uk, supra note 79, at 106. On other socialist countries, see I.
ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 148-49.
102. See, e.g., Decree of Minister of Health, June 13, 1969, withdrawing the medical
degree of a physician and sending him to a "labor camp for re-education," pursuant to a
decision by the Health Ministry's Disciplinary Council that he had improperly per-
formed two operations which resulted in the deaths of each patient, and that he refused
to marry a nurse who became pregnant by him, reported in Phu Nu Viet Nam,
July 1, 1969, at 23, reprinted in Translations on North Vietnam No. 539, Joint Publi-
cations Research Service, JPRS No. 48782, CA 121, Sept. 10, 1969, at 20-21.
103. Standing Committee, National Assembly, Resolution No. 49 NQ/TVQH,
June 21, 1961. Language in text, quoted in HOANG SON, REEDUCATION CAMPS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, reprinted in VIETNAM COURIER, VIETNAM: WHICH HUMAN RIGHTS? 81, 86 (1980).
Resolution No. 49, cited in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S
CONCERNS IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM WITH SELECTED CASE HISTORIES OF
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decree further defining "counter-revolutionary elements" and including
among persons subject to re-education "professional scoundrels",
which it defined to include a variety of persons who earned a living by
criminal means-thieves, pimps, and recalcitrant hooligans, where per-
sons in these categories had "refused to mend their ways" after being
subjected to non-incarceration re-education measures.
°0
Following its accession to power in the south in 1975, the Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government interned in re-education camps sub-
stantial numbers of former military personnel of the Republic of Viet
Nam, and it characterized this internment as a one-time measure ne-
cessitated by fear of possible efforts to overthrow the government. In
May 1976, it issued a directive authorizing re-education camp deten-
tion for up to three years, to be followed by release for those who had
reformed, and criminal trial for "die-hard agents of the former regime
who committed numerous crimes against the people."10 5 The S.R.V.
government held many of these military persons beyond the three
years indicated in the P.R.G. directive, citing security concerns, and
particularly China's 1979 invasion of Viet Nam, but released most of
them in 1987. It has indicated that it holds the current internees under
the cited 1961 D.R.V. decree. 0 '
The continuing validity of administrative procedures leading to re-
education detention was indicated by adoption in 1987 in Ho Chi Minh
City of regulations on re-education. The people's committee of Ho Chi
Minh City promulgated regulations, characterized as temporary, pro-
viding for re-education through forced labor of certain categories of
persons, including:
[P]ast or present counter-revolutionary elements who, charged
with many crimes, are still stubborn and refuse to be re-edu-
PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE 3 (1983), and in Young, The Legality of Vietnamese Re-edu-
cation Camps, 20HARV. INT'L L.J. 519, 534-35 (1979). Resolution 49 continued in force
after reunification. See HOANG SON, supra at 87. It provided three-year terms, which can
be repeated. Id. at 93. It was used in the early 1970s to place "counter-revolutionary
elements" in re-education. Id. at 90. It was stated in 1980 that none of those interned in
the early 1960s remained in detention. Id. at 93.
104. Circular No. 121-CP, D.R.V. Council of Ministers, Sept. 8, 1961, cited in
Young, supra note 103, at 535. For quoted language, see G. SAGAN & S. DENNEY, VIOLA-
TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM APRIL 30, 1975-
APRIL 30, 1983 18 (1983).
105. Directive of May 25, 1976, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Re-
port, Asia and Pacific, June 11, 1976, Annex, at 1-2; Young, supra note 103, at 520-21,
534-35. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, supra note 103, at 3. Directive explained in
HOANG SON, supra note 103, at 85. On the 1987 release, see SOUTH, Oct. 1987, at 7 (re-
lease of 6685, reduction in terms for 5320).
106. Id.
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cated despite a lenient policy and repeated re-education efforts
by the government; those professional hoodlums, perpetrators
of ordinary crimes, thugs and hooligans who constantly disturb
public order and security and who gather themselves for
merry-making and brawling; those elements who are engaged
in social vices-such as professional prostitutes and drug ad-
dicts-who have been arrested and sent to re-eduction centers
but have escaped from these centers for the second time; those
able-bodied people who refuse to earn an honest living, who
specialize in speculation and in the hoarding of goods of which
the circulation is banned, or who deal in counterfeit items;
those hoodlums who have served jail terms for criminal of-
fenses but still refuse to mend their ways; and those who are
given favor for undergoing re-education locally or being put
under house arrest but still refuse to respect the law. 0 7
Decisions under the regulations to send a person for re-education are
made by the Ho Chi Minh City people's committee on the recommen-
dation of precinct or district people's committees or of the director of
the city's public security service and are approved by the Ministry of
the Interior before becoming final. Re-education can be ordered up to a
maximum of two years. 0 8
Many Third World countries employ detention without criminal
charge, in part, out of concern that their justice institutions are not
sufficiently well-funded and staffed to be able to prove criminal
charges in court. That is likely a partial explanation of Viet Nam.
There is also a philosophy that re-education in detention re-integrates
into society those who are at odds with it. This kind of detention will
likely continue to be authorized until Viet Nam stabilizes.
VI. PUNISHMENT UNDER THE CODE
Like the Criminal Code of the Soviet Union (the "UK RSFSR"),
Chapter Four of the S.R.V. Code defines and explains the kinds of
penalties provided in the Special Part for specific offenses. Here, too,
the content is close to that of the Soviet codes. In particular, both
Codes provide for a type of punishment known as "correctional tasks,"
which permits a convicted person to continue his or her previous em-
ployment with a deduction in wages for a period of time as a fine. Like
the UK RSFSR, the S.R.V. Code permits as criminal punishment a
107. Saigon Giai Phong, July 4, 1987, translated into English in BRITISH BROADCAST-
ING CORP, SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, July 25, 1987, FE/8629/B/4 to FE/8629/B/5.
108. Id.
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warning,"0 " a money fine, 110 requirement of residing in a determined
area of the country,"1 prohibition against residence in a determined
area of the country, 11 2 the death penalty, " prohibition against assum-
ing certain employment positions,1 4 deprivation of certain civil
rights," and confiscation of property. " 6
A. Length of Incarceration
The S.R.V. Code authorizes longer imprisonment and more severe
sanctions for many offenses than do most socialist penal codes. For
theft of property of individuals, the S.R.V. Code provides for three-
year maximum sentences, while the UK RSFSR provides for one-year
maximum sentences. "' For theft of state property, the S.R.V. Code
provides for five-year maximum sentences, while the UK RSFSR pro-
vides three-year maximum sentences."' For speculation-buying goods
with intent to re-sell at a profit-the S.R.V. Code provides five-year
maximum sentences, while the UK RSFSR provides two-year maxi-
mum sentences, " and if done with large quantities of goods the S.R.V.
penalty increases to twelve-year maximum sentences, while the UK
RSFSR penalty increases to seven-year maximum sentences. 20 For
murder absent aggravating circumstances, the S.R.V. Code provides for
fifteen-year maximum sentences, while the UK RSFSR provides ten-
year maximum sentences.
1 2 1
Provisions defining punishment for particular offenses typically
provide a minimum-and often substantial-term of years."22  In So-
viet codes, a minimum term is set for some offenses, but for most it is
not. The S.R.V. Code in many provisions permits a more severe sen-
tence if the offense is committed under "serious circumstances" or en-
tails "serious consequences," without defining such circumstances or
109. CODE, supra note 2, art. 22; cf. UK RSFSR art. 33.
110. CODE, supra note 2, art. 23; cf. UK RSFSR art. 30.
111. CODE, supra note 2, art. 30; cf. UK RSFSR art. 25.
112. CODE, supra note 2, art. 29; cf. UK RSFSR art. 26.
113. CODE, supra note 2, art. 27; cf. UK RSFSR art. 23.
114. CODE, supra note 2, art. 28; cf. UK RSFSR art. 29.
115. CODE, supra note 2, art. 31; cf. UK RSFSR art. 29.
116. CODE, supra note 2, art. 32; cf. UK RSFSR art. 35.
117. CODE, supra note 2, art. 155; cf. UK RSFSR art. 144.
118. CODE, supra note 2, art. 132; cf. UK RSFSR art. 89.
119. CODE, supra note 2, art. 165; cf. UK RSFSR art. 154.
120. CODE, supra note 2, art. 165; cf. UK RSFSR art. 154.
121. CODE, supra note 2, art. 101; cf. UK RSFSR art. 103.
122. A court may, however, impose a sentence lower than the minimum if it finds
that "several" of the enumerated mitigating circumstances exist. CODE, supra note 2, art.
38.
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consequences. The severity of the sentences is mitigated by the fact
that the Code does not permit consecutive sentences where an accused
is convicted of several offenses at a single trial." ' 3
Unlike most socialist penal codes, the S.R.V. Code permits life im-
prisonment. It allows a court to sentence an individual to a maximum
of twenty years, or to life imprisonment. 2 " Socialist codes typically do
not permit life imprisonment, limiting imprisonment to a defined term
of years ranging from fifteen to twenty-five.12 5 Of the socialist states,
only China and the German Democratic Republic permit life
imprisonment.
1 2 6
Phan Hien explains why the code differs in this respect from other
socialist codes: "Unlike several socialist countries, we have as well the
punishment of life imprisonment, applicable to offenses for which the
death penalty would be too severe but the punishment of 20 years im-
prisonment would be rather light. 1 2 7 He does not explain, however,
why it was decided to deviate from the generally accepted socialist po-
sition that a life sentence violates the rehabilitative aim of criminal
punishment. That position is elucidated by a Soviet scholar explaining
why Soviet codes permit a sentence no longer than fifteen years:
This proposition of law reflects the well known statement of V.
I. Lenin that the significance of punishment lies not in it sever-
ity but in the inevitability of its imposition. In fact a too-sub-
stantial term of deprivation of liberty can at times lead not to
strengthening the educational impact of punishment but to its
weakening, since a convicted person does not feel any real pos-
sibility of being freed and not infrequently becomes bitter. In
itself a 10- or 15-year period of deprivation of freedom is suffi-
ciently great to allow for application of all means and methods
of corrective-labor rehabilitation. If in that period it has not
been possible to achieve correction and re-education of the
convicted person, it is not likely possible to achieve it through
a longer term of incarceration. 8
123. CODE, supra note 2, art. 41.
124. Id. arts. 25, 26.
125. See, e.g., UK RSFSR art. 24 (for a 15-year maximum).
126. P.R.C. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 78, art. 28; Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] art. 14 (E.
Ger.).
127. Hien, supra note 35, at 20.
128. N. STRUCHKOV, 3 KuRs SOVETSKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA [Course in Soviet Crimi-
nal Law] 79-80 (1970).
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B. Death Penalty
Like other socialist codes,' 29 the S.R.V. Code provides the death
penalty for a number of serious offenses. As with the other codes, it
characterizes the death penalty as an "exceptional punishment, '" 30 but
it omits the language found in some socialist codes declaring that the
death penalty is in force only "until its total abolition."'31 Thus, the
Code provides no implication that the death penalty is temporary. The
death penalty is provided for more offenses than in the penal codes of
other socialist states. 32 The increase is found primarily in crimes
against the state, where the S.R.V. Code defines a larger number of
offenses than the socialist codes and provides the death penalty for a
number of them.'33
C. Reasons for Severity
The severity of the S.R.V. Code is a product of Vietnam's eco-
nomic and political situation. Viet Nam has experienced a recent in-
crease in crime: "In our country, crime has increased and changed in a
complex manner in recent years."'3 4 Phan Hien identifies as crimi-
nogenic factors: (1) the final show of resistance by the toppled exploit-
ing classes; (2) acts of sabotage by the imperialists and other interna-
tional reactionary powers; (3) the influences of bourgeois and other
non-proletarian ideas; (4) shortcomings in one aspect or another of the
management of the country; (5) the failure of the system of law to
keep pace with socio-economic developments at some times and places;
and (6) shortcomings in crime prevention.'35
Concern over the situation resulting from this recent history is re-
flected in Phan Hien's statement that the Code pursues "a decisive
struggle and without mercy against criminality" and that it reflects
"the spirit of great severity that the present situation demands."' 3 6 He
129. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 126.
130. CODE, supra note 2, art. 27; UK RSFSR art. 23; see I. ANDREEV, supra note 22,
at 126.
131. UK RSFSR art. 23.
132. In comparison with the Soviet codes, the single exception is for offenses commit-
ted by military personnel, where the Soviet codes provide the death penalty for more
offenses than does the S.R.V. CODE. See, e.g., UK RSFSR art. 247 (death penalty for
desertion to avoid military service); cf. S.R.V. CODE art. 259 (maximum 10 years impris-
onment); UK RSFSR art. 249 (death penalty for self-mutilation by military personnel to
avoid military duties); S.R.V. CODE art. 260 (maximum 10 years imprisonment).
133. See text accompanying notes 109-99.
134. Hien, supra note 86, at 25.
135. Id. at 25.
136. Hien, supra note 35, at 19.
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characterizes those persons for whom the Code provides severe
punishment:
With regard to counter-revolutionary elements, punish-
ment must be resolute and severe. With regard to recalcitrant
elements, hooligans, thugs and dangerous recidivists, there
should be severe punishment. Severe punishment should also
be meted out to degenerate cadres who abuse their power,
commit grave violations of the people's right to collective mas-
tery or who are guilty of embezzlement, corruption, collusion
with bad elements.
1 3 7
A number of factors contribute to the high levels of crime in Viet
Nam: 1) socialization of the economy; 2) division of Viet Nam; 3) im-
pact on Society of the 1945-1975 war; 4) economic impact of the 1945-
1975 war and of withdrawal of United States forces; 5) concern for se-
curity; 6) legacy of colonialism; 7) legacy of the Mandarins; and 8) Leg-
acy of Confucianism.
The S.R.V. Code was drafted against a background of recent socie-
tal disorder. Viet Nam is undergoing in the south the early stages of
socialization of industry, commerce and agriculture. This socialization
process occurred in the north in the 1950's, where its most spectacular
manifestation was reprisals by peasants against landowners. There,
large groups of peasants on occasion conducted unstructured trials of
landlords and then killed them. The government ultimately put an end
to this process, criticizing the excesses.138 For a time, the D.R.V. gov-
ernment used "special people's courts," empowered to impose a death
sentence, to try "counter-revolutionary elements, criminal officials, and
anyone carrying out activity directed against the agrarian or sabotaging
it.,,118
Land reform in the south after 1975 has avoided the upheaval gen-
erated in the north in the 1950's,14o but conflict has nonetheless been
137. Hien, supra note 34, at 6.
138. KESSING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, Jan. 26-Feb. 2, 1957, at 15349; see also B.
FALL, LE VIET-MINH: LA ROPUBLiQUE DOMOCRATIQUE DU VIET-NAM: 1945-1960, at 106
(1960).
139. Decree No. 149/150, President of the D.R.V., Apr. 12, 1953, arts. 2, 11, "On the
Organization of Special People's Courts," reprinted in 0. ARTUROV, DEMOKRATICHESKAIA
RESPUBLIKA VIETNAM: KONSTITUTSn, ZAKONODATEL'NYE AKTY, DOKUMENTY [The Democratic
Republic of Vietnam: Constitutions, Legislative Acts, Documents] 315 (1955). On these
courts, see B. FALL, supra note 138, at 101; Huong, supra note 22, at 189. The acts pun-
ishable in these courts were defined in Decree No. 151, President of the D.R.V.,
Apr. 12, 1953, "On Sanctions Against Landlords Violating the Laws," reprinted in 0.
ARTUROV, supra, at 320.
140. Marr, Central Vietnam Rebuilds: An Eyewitness Account, INDOCHINA ISSUES,
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generated. Such a process has been turbulent in all the socialist coun-
tries: "The effectuation of socialist reforms-nationalization of indus-
try, creation of collective, large-scale agriculture, etc.-has met resis-
tance from the representatives of big capital and a part of the petty
bourgeois elements, which frequently was expressed in criminal incur-
sions against these reforms."'"
Phan Hien indicates that one factor facilitating crime "shortcom-
ings" is "management of the country." This is a reference to economic
problems connected with socialization, like shortages of goods, which
engenders theft and speculation. The Communist Party of Viet Nam
since 1985 slowed the process of socialization in the south and has re-
opened a greater role for private production and commerce.
A major source of conflict is the different kinds of society found in
the two halves of Viet Nam. The south has developed under French
and United States influence, while socialist reforms took place in the
north. In 1975, the two societies were thrown together. A highly indi-
vidualist society and a substantially socialistic one were suddenly
merged. Moreover, the two halves had been at war with each other,
engendering the hostilities one finds in any country following a civil
war.
Further, the south experienced social ills resulting from the fact
that the war was fought primarily in that half of the country. The most
serious is population shifts to urban areas by peasants escaping war in
rural areas. Major cities in the south experienced a tripling of their
populations.""2 These cities were not equipped to provide housing or
employment.
Viet Nam was divided not only between north and south, but also
within the south, where extensive areas were held during the 1960's
and early 1970's by the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the re-
mainder being held by the government of the Republic of Viet Nam.
Social differences developed between the two areas. As regards crimi-
nal justice, the P.R.G. was unable to maintain regular courts and cor-
rections systems in the areas it controlled. 4"
During the war many persons in the south made a living from the
July 1985, no. 59, at 1-2.
141. Pzshenosil, Preduprezhdeniie-glavnoe napravienie bor'by s prestupnost'iu v
sotsialisticheskikh stranakh [Prevention--the Main Direction in the Struggle Against
Crime in Socialist Countries], in SOVREMENNYE TENDENTSII RAZVITIIA SOTSIALISTICHESKOGO
UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA [Contemporary Tendencies in the Development of Socialist Criminal
Law) 153, 160-61 (V. Kudriavtsev ed. 1983).
142. J. BUTTINGER, A DRAGON DEFIANT. A SHORT HISTORY OF VIETNAM 18 (1972).
143. Interview with Ngo Ba Thanh, attorney and member of the National Assembly,
in Ho Chi Minh City (Dec. 6, 1978).
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United States military, working for United States personnel as domes-
tic servants, stealing from United States military commissaries or
working as prostitutes. At the war's end, there were reportedly 300,000
prostitutes in the south of Viet Nam, half suffering from syphilis. 44
After departure of the United States troops, these people were without
employment. The S.R.V. was unable to provide urban employment to
this population. It endeavored, in part successfully, to get this popula-
tion to move to farms it established in rural areas. Still, many re-
mained without local ties and without a means of survival. This situa-
tion promoted crime. The fact that many in this group had existed by
criminal means during the presence of United States forces meant that
they were accustomed to such a life.
Drug use further encouraged crime. The Central Intelligence
Agency had won the support of Laotian hill people by flying their
opium crop to Saigon, with leading officials of the government of the
Republic of Viet Nam being involved in the traffic there.' 5 Drug use in
Saigon grew at a rapid rate. 4" By the war's end, there were reportedly
150,000 drug addicts in the south of Viet Nam.1
7
The four decades of war disrupted Viet Nam socially and physi-
cally.4 Mass movement of population broke up traditional social
groupings that had given order to Vietnamese society, and people
found themselves living among strangers. Migration from rural to ur-
ban areas in many countries has created an anomie that is crimi-
nogenic. Viet Nam experienced this phenomenon on perhaps a greater
scale than any other country in recent history. The rural pacification
program of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam and the
United States Army had moved villagers to new areas, while wide-scale
aerial bombardment of rural areas created a flight to cities. During and
after the war, thousands of children were left without supervision,
which engendered street gang crime by juveniles. 49
While there were no substantial physical reprisals against person-
144. Paringaux, Consequence de la guerre: Hanoi doit faire soigner un million
d'habitants du Sud atteints de maladies vnriennes et preparer la rinsertion sociale
de trois cent mille prostitu~es, Le Monde, June 2, 1977, at 3, col. 1.
145. A. McCoy, THE POLITICS oi HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 247, 263 (1972).
146. Can, L'Eradication de la Toxicomanie [Eradication of Drug Addiction], VIET-
NAM COURIER, no. 6, at 25-26 (1985).
147. KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVEs, Apr. 7, 1978, at 28911.
148. For an account of social dislocation in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) at the end of
the war, see NGUYEN KHAC VIEN, VIET NAM PATRIE RETROUVPE 109-44 (1977).
149. Dao Chi Uk, Preduprezhdeniie prestupnosti nesovershennoletnikh v S.R. V.
[Prevention of Juvenile Crime in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam], SOVETSKOE
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [Soviet State and Law], no. 12, at 100, 102-03 (1980).
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nel of the R.V.N.,' 50 fear of resumption of hostilities led the S.R.V.
government to intern large numbers of former R.V.N. military person-
nel. In addition, termination of the war resulted in the demobilization
of 1,250,000 soldiers and police of the Republic of Viet Nam.1"1 These
persons were not readily absorbed into civilian occupations and most
were not favorably inclined to the S.R.V. government. As a result,
many became involved in crime.
The aerial bombardment and defoliation left much of the land un-
productive, leaving the country in a condition of even worse poverty
than it had known before. "Vast areas were repeatedly carpet bombed
and sprayed with herbicides. Millions of central Vietnamese were up-
rooted from their villages and forced to cluster in refugee camps or
urban slums."182 Fifteen percent of the land in the south was affected
by toxic chemicals sprayed on it during the war. 53 This situation of
general privation engendered cynicism among many, as the govern-
ment was unable immediately to create conditions for life at reasonable
levels of consumption.
The inability of many in the south to survive economically after
departure of United States forces on whom they had depended was a
major reason for departure of large numbers of Vietnamese from the
country. That phenomenon also engendered crime, as unscrupulous
persons promised transportation to other countries and then took
money but failed to provide the transportation. Much violence resulted
from this unscrupulous activity. The government, pressured by the in-
ternational community, then tried to stop the outflow of population,
which created a major police problem and more social conflict.
China's invasion in 1979 and continuing border incidents since
that time have caused further concern about security. Additionally,
Viet Nam's military involvement in Kampuchea in opposition to a gov-
ernment supported by China has kept China-Viet Nam relations tense.
Some Vietnamese in the border area are believed by the government to
have collaborated with the Chinese military in attacks into Viet Nam.
In addition to the disruption connected with its war, Viet Nam
faces the problems of a colonial territory emerging into independence.
That factor alone makes it difficult to erect a society based on rule of
law. Colonial governments in Asia and Africa introduced formal court
systems based on legislation, whereas in the past, society was regulated
by less formal procedures and norms. This was true even of Viet Nam
150. KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, Apr. 7, 1978, at 28910.
151. Dao Chi Uk, supra note 149, at 102.
152. Marr, supra note 140, at 1.
153. Rogers, Agent Orange in Vietnam: America's Shared Legacy, INDOCHINA ISSUES,
Sept. 1985, no. 60, at 2.
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which, while it had Chinese-based penal legislation, relied extensively
on informal processes for social regulation. Penal law based on French
law was out of keeping with Vietnamese tradition.'"
Thus, the first experience of these territories with law in the Euro-
pean sense was a legal system established by the colonial power. Typi-
cally, the colonial power's principal objective was to use the natural
resources and labor of the colonial territory. The law was often used to
achieve that objective rather than to promote the interests of the local
population. In Africa, law was used as a mechanism to induce the pop-
ulation into plantation labor.
Courts in Viet Nam, as in other colonial territories, were staffed by
colonial-power nationals who typically did not know the local language
and did not understand local ways. 155 The judiciary consisted of
French nationals or naturalized French natives from other French pos-
sessions. " "The French magistracy rotated between the different colo-
nies with such rapidity that it was not felt worth the effort to learn
native languages and law."1" '
The result of this introduction to law via colonialism is that the
local population develops a perception of law as an alien-imposed
structure that does not serve their interests. This has made it difficult
for post-colonial governments to establish a rule of law. 5
This post-colonial phenomenon has been cited by Vietnamese ju-
rists as engendering a "nihilistic attitude to[ward] law": "The nearly
century-long rule of the French colonizers... gave nothing good in this
respect as [a) result of the severity of colonial laws regarding natives
and the maintenance with their assistance of ethnic discrimination and
social injustice."'
59
Even the court system that pre-dated France's had done little to
engender respect for the rule of law. The Chinese-style, highly bureau-
cratic courts presided over by officials called mandarins had been con-
sidered a place to avoid rather than a place to find justice.'
Finally, Viet Nam carries the legacy of Confucianism.' This leg-
acy was reflected in the Chinese-based penal codes, particularly in the
154. R. JUMPER & N. HUE, NOTES ON THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF
Vir NAM 126 (1962).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. V. THOMPSON, FRENCH INDOCHINA 255 (1937).
158. See generally Shivji, Law in Independent Africa: Some Reflections on the Role
of Legal Ideology, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 689 (1985).
159. Dao Chi Uk, supra note 79, at 108.
160. R. JUMPER & N. HUE, supra note 154, at 28, 67.
161. Mau, supra note 5, at 41.
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important role the Chinese attributed to status based on gender and
family position. Confucian philosophy stressed living by rules of proper
conduct, but in a highly hierarchical setting in which obedience was
the key virtue."6 2 Loyalty to family prevailed over loyalty to rules im-
posed by political authority.16 3 "Government by men" prevailed over
"government by laws.'' 64 Vietnamese jurists cite this legacy as an im-
pediment to the establishment of a rule of law: "In the past Viet Nam
found itself under the influence of Confucianism, with its nihilistic at-
titude towards law.'1
65
The cumulative effect of these eight factors in Viet Nam's history
and contemporary situation is difficulty in securing adherence to norms
of law.
D. Rehabilitation as an Aim of Punishment
The Code's punishment philosophy is characterized as one of "ap-
plying extreme severity coupled with adequate leniency; and meting
out proper punishment accompanied by due attention to education
and reform.' 6 In its characterization of the aim of punishment, the
Code, despite its severe penalties, stresses rehabilitation:
Punishment is aimed not only at punishing the guilty person; it
aims as well at his reform, in order to make of him a man use-
ful to society, knowing how to obey the law and the rules of
social life, and at prevention of new offenses that he might
commit.
6 1
Leniency is to be shown towards "those who show sincere repen-
tance, own up to their crime, denounce their associates, accomplish re-
deeming actions, [and] pledge to repair the damage caused.' 086 Reha-
bilitation is based on "faith in the possibility of transforming man
under the socialist regime.'
6
As in other socialist countries, labor approximating labor done
outside penal institutions is required of prisoners, on the theory that
rehabilitation is fostered through labor. In Viet Nam, the primary work
done by prisoners is agricultural. 7 '
162. V. THOMPSON, supra note 157, at 41-42.
163. Mau, supra note 5, at 53.
164. Id. at 41.
165. Dao Chi Uk, supra note 79, at 108.
166. Hien, supra note 34, at 5.
167. CODE, supra note 2, art. 20.
168. Hien, supra note 34, at 6.
169. Hien, supra note 35, at 19.
170. Interview with President of Province Court, Quang Ninh Province, in Ha Long,
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Article 3 of the Code calls for leniency towards certain categories
of offenders:
Those who have sincerely repented, have confessed, have de-
nounced their accomplices, have made up for their mistake by
meritorious acts, or who have voluntarily repaired the harm
and losses caused shall be judged with leniency. To those who
have for the first time committed an infraction belonging to
the less serious category and who have repented, lighter penal-
ties than imprisonment can be used; they can be entrusted to
state agencies or social organization for re-education, or to
their family undertaking a guarantee for their conduct."'
This approach is said to reflect "socialist humanism and faith in the
possibility of transforming man under our system.' 172 It follows prac-
tices in other socialist countries, where non-incarceration sentences
predominate. 7 3 It has antecedents in prior D.R.V. law. The 1960 law
on the courts stated: "A penalty is not only punishment for a crime
committed; it is intended as well to reform and re-educate the guilty
party."'17' Early release is granted to prisoners "if they repent and
prove it by their discipline, productive labor and political attitude."'' 75
In pursuit of rehabilitation, the Code makes extensive provision
for re-education without detention, 17 a penalty that has been widely
used in other socialist countries.17 7 This penalty permits a person con-
victed of a minor offense to continue working; the other workers must
agree to take responsibility for rehabilitation, and a 5% to 20% salary
deduction as a penal fine is imposed. The maximum time for such an
arrangement is two years.77 Re-education without detention was first
introduced in Vietnamese law in the 1981 Military Obligation Law. 179
Viet Nam (Dec. 9, 1978).
171. CODE, supra note 2, art. 3.
172. Minh, supra note 44, at 64.
173. Buchholtz & Den, Certain Issues in the Theory of Punishment, in SOVREMEN-
NYE TENDENTSII RAZVITIIA SOTSIALISTICHESKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA [Contemporary Ten-
dencies in the Development of Socialist Criminal Law] 76, 88 (V. Kudriavtsev ed. 1983).
174. Law on the Organization of People's Tribunals, supra note 28, art. 1, para. 5.
175. Huong, supra note 22, at 202; see also CoDE, supra note 2, art. 49 (provides for
early release).
176. CODE, supra note 2, art. 24.
177. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 133-35; see also Buchholtz & Den, supra note 173,
at 97.
178. CODE, supra note 2, art. 24, para. 1.
179. Minh, supra, note 44, at 67. For a discussion of the Military Obligation Law of
December 30, 1981, see Pham, Military Service Law, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, July 9, 1982, at K5.
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It is viewed as having an "essentially educational character,"' 80 and its
advantages are seen as several:
[T]he convicted person is not isolated from society, is not de-
tained together with other more dangerous convicts who might
exercise a bad influence on him. He will not be stigmatized and
will have the opportunity to benefit from family education and
from the oversight of the state agency or social organization of
which he is a member. Thus he will have favorable conditions
to return more rapidly to the honest life.18" '
Re-education without detention also has practical benefits, which is
particularly important in a developing society: "It avoids additional ex-
pense to construct new prison buildings and to pay salaries of guard
personnel."18 It also serves the socialist aim of giving over governmen-
tal functions to social organizations, viewed as a prerequisite for devel-
opment of society from socialism to communism. 83 Only less serious
offenders are eligible for the re-education without detention option.'
This penalty is unique to socialist penal codes. It corresponds to a
certain degree to probation in Western penal codes. However, it is
probably more effective than probation, since the work group takes re-
sponsibility for re-education, which is typically not carried out to a
substantial degree in Western states by a probation officer. It is the
principal penalty used when a court decides on leniency.8
The S.R.V. Code authorizes suspension of a sentence of imprison-
ment if such is deemed more rehabilitative than the serving of the sen-
tence. This is permitted only if the sentence is for five years or less.
The court fixes a probation period of one to five years' 8 6 and entrusts
the convicted person to the work collective, or to a social organization
at the place of residence, "for the purpose of oversight and educa-
tion." ' 8 7 Thus, the collective serves a role that in some Western states
would be fulfilled by a probation officer. If the convicted person
"achieves considerable progress" during the first half of the probation
period, the court may, on motion of the collective, shorten the remain-
ing probation period. 88
180. Hien, supra note 35, at 20.
181. Minh, supra note 44, at 68; see also Hien, supra note 35, at 20.
182. Minh, supra note 44, at 68.
183. Id.
184. CODE, supra note 2, art. 24, para. 1.
185. 1. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 133-35.
186. CODE, supra note 2, art. 44, para. 1.
187. Id. art. 44, paras. 1, 2.
188. Id. art. 44, para. 4.
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Another rehabilitation mechanism common to socialist penal codes
is expunging a convicted person's record, either by a court upon a
showing of good character after a stipulated period, or, with less seri-
ous offenses, automatically. Those whose records are automatically ex-
punged are persons completing a probation period without committing
a new crime; those who do not commit a new crime for three years
after completing a sentencing involving a warning, a fine, or re-educa-
tion without detention; and those who do not commit a new crime for
five years after completing a term of incarceration of up to five
years."'9
The S.R.V. Code omits two rehabilitation-oriented procedures pro-
vided by other socialist codes-suretyship and transfer to a comrade's
court. The UK RSFSR provides for a social organization to accept an
accused on "surety," if the accused repents, and if the act caused no
serious consequences.'" This is done before trial. The accused is not
put on trial, and thus is not convicted. As with education without de-
tention, it is aimed at using the work collective for rehabilitation. It is,
in effect, a milder form of re-education without detention, since the
trial is circumvented. No provision is made for "suretyship" in the
S.R.V. Code.
The Code also omits a procedure common in socialist codes of ter-
mination of proceedings prior to trial with transfer of the suspect to a
lay court, typically called a "comrade's court," functioning in the sus-
pect's apartment complex or workplace. 9' This procedure is permitted
only for first offenders charged with less serious offenses. The rationale
is that in such cases, the individual may be more effectively convinced
to avoid future lawbreaking by the social pressure brought to bear in a
proceeding held before the suspect's residence or workplace colleagues.
The comrade's court applies only minor penalties, which are not
deemed criminal sanctions and it has no power to incarcerate.' Viet
Nam has no comrade's courts, though the thirty-family neighborhood
groups that function in many locations handle minor disputes and in-
189. Id. art. 53.
190. UK RSFSR art. 52; see also Kelina, Zamena ugolovnoi otvetstvennosti inymi
merami vozdeistviia [Replacement of Criminal Liability with Other Measures of Pres-
sure] in SOVREMENNYE TENDENTSII RAZVITIIA SOTSIALISTICHESKOGO UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA
[Contemporary Tendencies in the Development of Socialist Criminal Law] 125, 131, 146-
49 (V. Kudriavtsev ed. 1983) (other socialist code provisions for suretyship); I. ANDREEV,
supra note 22, at 143-45.
191. UK RSFSR art. 51. On other socialist code provisions for transfer to a comrade's
court, see Kelina, supra note 190, at 131, 144-46; see also I. ANDREEv supra note 22, at
146-48.
192. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 146-48.
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fractions, in addition to administrative functions.193
E. Public Education as an Aim of Punishment
The Code identifies one additional purpose of punishment. It
"aims as well at the education of others in respect for the law, in the
struggle against and prevention of offenses."' 94 This is a distinctly so-
cialist approach-an explicit code statement that a purpose of punish-
ment is education of the public. 9 ' The Soviet penal codes do not in-
clude such a statement of an educational purpose, but the Soviet
criminal procedure codes do: "Criminal proceedings should further the
strengthening of socialist legality, the prevention and eradication of
crimes, and the education of citizens in a spirit of execution of Soviet
laws and respect for the rules of socialist community life.""' The
S.R.V. statement is even more explicit about the educational aim, re-
ferring to those intended to be educated as "others," meaning persons
other than the accused person.
Criminal punishment is viewed as contributing to a new legal con-
sciousness to replace the negative public attitude about law that re-
sults from Viet Nam's history:
The formative and stimulating effect of criminal law is seen in
... socialist legal consciousness. Like law in general, criminal
law exerts on the members of society an informational and
value-orienting effect. This means that through the enactment
and application of laws, the content of the various criminal-law
norms is brought to the attention of the population, and
thereby demonstration is made of the intolerant attitude of the
state and society to particular anti-social conduct and of a
readiness to fight such conduct by the most decisive
measures.1
97
193. Interview by author with Tranh Tran Vy, Mayor of Hanoi, in Hanoi, Viet Nam,
Dec 1. 1978.
194. CODE, supra note 2, art. 20.
195. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR: AN INTERPRETATION OF SovIEr LAW 282-84
(1963).
196. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES CRIM. P. OF THE USSR AND UNION REPUBLICS art. 2
(1958).
197. Dao Chi Uk, supra note 79, at 109.
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F. Strategy to Eliminate Crime
Drafters of the Code, citing Marx and Engels, do not view criminal
penalties as sufficient for eliminating crime: "to put an end to criminal
acts... the only remedy is to abolish the system of exploitation of man
by man." 98 They view long-term changes in society as the only mecha-
nism for eliminating crime. "Since the bases for full elimination of
crime are connected chiefly with further reform of society, punishment
is, though a necessary means, nonetheless a subsidiary means in the
struggle against crime."199 This view derives both from the historical
materialist approach and from Viet Nam's history. The social chaos in
which Viet Nam finds itself must be remedied if criminal activity is to
be stopped.
VII. OUTSIDE INFLUENCES ON THE CODE
The 1985 Code draws heavily from the legislation adopted by the
D.R.V. It is firmly rooted in the socialist economic and political order
of Viet Nam. Its opening article states the "tasks" of the Code as being
those of "defending the socialist system and the people's right to so-
cialist collective mastery, protecting the right of equality among na-
tionalities, safeguarding the people's basic rights, protecting socialist
law and order, combating all criminal acts."2 00 Its preamble states that
the Code "embodies the right to socialist collective mastery of our peo-
ple under the leadership of the working class."20 1
Phan Hien sees the Code's origins as lying both within Viet Nam's
own history and within the socialist family of law:
It [the Code] utilizes the experience acquired in the prevention
of and struggle against crime in recent decades, continues in
developing the tradition of Vietnamese penal law from the Au-
gust [1945] Revolution to the present and has drawn on the
experience of the fraternal socialist countries, notably the So-
viet Union, in the elaboration of penal legislation.20 2
Influence from the socialist, and particularly the Soviet, codes is
evident both in content and in structure. Similarity to the Soviet codes
in format is particularly evident in Chapter One (Articles 1-19). These
articles closely track the first chapter of the Soviet codes in content, as
198. Minh, supra note 44, at 65.
199. Buchholtz & Den, supra note 173, at 108-09.
200. CODE, supra note 2, art. 1.
201. Id. preamble, para. 4.
202. Hien, supra note 35, at 19.
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well as in subchapter breakdown and numerical sequence of the provi-
sions. Like the Soviet codes, the S.R.V. Code proceeds as follows:
1) tasks of the Code; 03 2) limitation of penal responsibility to viola-
tion of acts prohibited by the Code;204 3) territorial application; 05
4) application to offenses committed outside the state territory; 0 6
5) operation of the Code in time (prohibition against retroactive appli-
cation);2 0 7 6) concept of an offense;208 7) offenses committed intention-
ally;2 0 9 8) offenses committed without intent; 10 9) offenses committed
while insane21 1 or under alcoholic intoxication;21 2 10) self-defense;""
11) choice of evil (emergency situations);
2 14 12) inchoate offenses;215
13) voluntary withdrawal before completion of an offense;1 6 14)
complicity; 17 15) concealment of an offense;2 8 and 16) failure to re-
port crimes where a specific offense requires reporting.2 9
Influence from Viet Nam's two thousand years of Chinese-based
penal legislation is not apparent. The death penalty provision is one in
which such an influence might appear, since Chinese law has an un-
usual procedure that permits reprieve after a period of time if the of-
fender shows repentance. This procedure is followed even in contempo-
rary Chinese law. 2 0 No such procedure appears in the death penalty
provision of the S.R.V. Code. 22
French penal law has exerted its influence upon the Code. French
law was the law in force when the current senior generation of
Vietnamese jurists was trained and many of them took their law stud-
ies in France. Under French administration, the judges were French,
and French was the language of the courts. French was formerly the
official language of the courts, and it remains the language of a law
203. CODE, supra note 2, art. 1; cf. UK RSFSR art. 1.
204. CODE, supra note 2, art. 2; cf. UK RSFSR art. 3.
205. CODE, supra note 2, art. 5; cf. UK RSFSR art. 4.
206. CODE, supra note 2, art. 6; cf. UK RSFSR art. 5.
207. CODE, supra note 2, art. 7; cf. UK RSFSR art. 6.
208. CODE, supra note 2, art. 8; cf. UK RSFSR art. 7.
209. CODE, supra note 2, art. 9; cf. UK RSFSR art. 8.
210. CODE, supra note 2, art. 10; cf. UK RSFSR art. 9.
211. CODE, supra note 2, art. 12; cf. UK RSFSR art. 11.
212. CODE, supra note 2, art. 12; cf. UK RSFSR art. 12.
213. CODE, supra note 2, art. 13; cf. UK RSFSR art. 13.
214. CODE, supra note 2, art. 14; cf. UK RSFSR art. 14.
215. CODE, supra note 2, art. 15; cf. UK RSFSR art. 15.
216. CODE, supra note 2, art. 16; cf. UK RSFSR art. 16.
217. CODE, supra note 2, art. 17; cf. UK RSFSR art. 17.
218. CODE, supra note 2, art. 18; cf. UK RSFSR art. 18.
219. CODE, supra note 2, art. 19; cf. UK RSFSR art. 19.
220. P.R.C. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 78, art. 43.
221. CODE, supra note 2, art. 27.
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journal, Bulletin de droit, published by the Viet Nam Lawyers Associ-
ation. That journal has carried French translations of the Code."" In
addition, criminal procedure in Viet Nam reflects the style of the
French courts.
2 23
While the Code shows an influence from socialist penal codes, it
must be recalled that those codes are similar in many respects to the
French Penal Code, particularly as regards their General Part. Soviet
penal law descends from nineteenth century Russian law that had bor-
rowed heavily from Western Europe. Socialist codes retain much from
their pre-revolution codes.
As with the French Penal Code, but unlike most socialist codes,
the S.R.V. Code divides offenses into two categories, calling one
"crime" and the other "delict." Article 8, paragraph 2 provides: "Seri-
ous offenses that cause great danger to society and for which the maxi-
mum applicable punishment is greater than five years of imprison-
ment, life imprisonment, or the death penalty, shall be denominated
crimes. The remaining offenses of less seriousness shall be denomi-
nated delicts." The French Penal Code also divides offenses into crime
and delict.2 ' The French Penal Code uses this distinction in its provi-
sion on attempted crime, penalizing an attempt at a crime, but not an
attempt at a delict.2 25 The S.R.V. Code penalizes attempts at any of-
fense, whether a crime or a delict. Unlike the French Penal Code, the
S.R.V. Code penalizes preparation (seeking and preparing means or
creating conditions) but here uses the crime-delict distinction, penaliz-
ing preparation for a crime only.2 2e The socialist penal codes have tra-
ditionally made no distinction between crime and delict.227 However,
around 1970 four socialist states introduced such a distinc-
tion-Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic
Republic.
2 28
222. See supra note 2.
223. Based on the author's observation of criminal case hearings in Hanoi in 1978.
224. CODE PINAL [C. PEN.] art. 1 (Fr.). On the crime-delict distinction in S.R.V. CODE
art. 8, see Kam, Osnovnye cherty otshchei chasti UK SRV [Essential Features of the
General Part of the Criminal Code of the S.R.V.], SOVETSKAIA IUSTrrSIIA, no. 9, at 27
(1987).
225. C. PEN. art. 2 (Fr.); see also H. DONNEDIEU DE VABREs, TRArrt DE DROIT CRIMINEL
Er DE LAGISLATION P.NALE COMPAR E 95 (1947). French procedure law handles crime dif-
ferently from delict-the two are handled by different courts, and pre-trial investigation
is more complex for crime. Id. at 93.
226. CODE, supra note 2, art. 15.
227. See, e.g., UK RSFSR art.7.
228. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 63-65; see also Horvath, supra note 39, at 29-33.
The German Democratic Republic [hereinafter G.D.R.] Code, like the French and S.R.V.
Codes, uses the distinction in providing liability for attempt. STGB art. 1 (E. Ger.). The
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The S.R.V. Code differs from most socialist codes by providing for
life imprisonment.2 2 9 The French Penal Code permits life imprison-
ment,2 3 0 as does the P.R.C. Code..2 " The reason for the S.R.V. Code
provision likely relates to domestic conditions, as indicated above,
rather than to outside influence.
While the S.R.V. Code is clearly within the family of socialist pe-
nal codes, the significance of its following of socialist approaches has
the additional result of keeping the S.R.V. Code within the European
tradition. That is, however, hardly a foregone conclusion, since the last
previous penal code of Viet Nam was Chinese.
VIII. OFFENSES AGAINST THE STATE
Like other socialist penal codes, the S.R.V. Code penalizes a wide
range of conduct as crimes against the state. It provides severe punish-
ment, including the death penalty, for a number of offenses. The
S.R.V. Code provides the death penalty for the following offenses: high
treason;232 subversive activity against people's power (organizing or be-
ing active in a group to overthrow government); "  espionage;23 4 in-
fringement on territorial security (entry into the territory of Viet Nam
followed by commission of sabotage); " rebellion (armed activity
against people's power); 236 banditry (armed activity in a remote region
involving murder, pillage, or property destruction, with intent to op-
pose people's power);227 terrorism (attempted murder with intent to
oppose people's power);238 destruction of the material and technical ba-
ses of socialism (destruction of political or economic institutions with
intent to oppose people's power);
2 9 hijacking of ships or airplanes;24
0
G.D.R. Code also penalizes attempt at any crime, but attempt at only those delicts where
the code provision defining the penalty for the delict specifies that attempt shall consti-
tute an offense. Id. art. 43.
229. See CODE, supra note 2, arts. 25, 26; cf. UK RSFSR art. 24; see also text accom-
panying notes 117-28.
230. C. PEN. art. 7 (Fr.).
231. P.R.C. CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 78, art. 28.
232. CODE, supra note 2, art. 72. On treason in other socialist codes, see I. ANDREEV,
supra note 22, at 88-89.
233. CODE, supra note 2, art. 73.
234. Id. art. 74.
235. Id. art. 75.
236. Id. art. 76.
237. Id. art. 77.
238. Id. art. 78.
239. Id. art. 79. On related offenses of sabotage and diversion in socialist codes, see I.
ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 89-90.
240. CODE, supra note 2, art. 87.
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manufacture, possession, distribution of false currency; destruction of
currency (said acts under serious circumstances).24
Amnesty International has criticized this section of the Code on
grounds that it has "prescribed the death penalty for a wide variety of
offenses including non-violent political offenses." '242 Of the offenses
against the state carrying the death penalty, however, three can be
charged without alleging violence: treason, espionage, and subversive
activity. Treason is defined as providing intelligence information to a
foreign power with intent to threaten the independence of Viet Nam.24
Espionage is defined as providing to a foreign power either intelligence
information or information that, while not involving state secrets, can
be used against Viet Nam.2 " Subversive activity against the people's
power (organizing or being active in a group to overthrow the govern-
ment) carries the death penalty only for a person who is "the orga-
nizer, instigator, or a particularly active agent" of such a group or "who
has caused serious consequences. 245
Severity regarding crimes against the state was a feature of tradi-
tional Chinese and Vietnamese codes. 24 But it is also a feature of so-
cialist codes. With Viet Nam, as with other socialist states, this phe-
nomenon is likely a result of its situation. As states espousing a
radically different form of government, the socialist states have engen-
dered opposition, both internally and from non-socialist states. Inter-
nally, their policies are opposed by many, particularly by those whose
interests are threatened by socialization of productive property.
Internationally, their policies have been opposed by powerful
states, which have on occasion used military force in an effort to re-
move socialist governments. Several states intervened militarily in So-
viet Russia shortly after its socialist revolution. 4 7 While that interven-
tion was unsuccessful, it created a fear of subversion by outside forces
and by internal forces that might collaborate with them. In 1961 the
United States intervened militarily against Cuba (Bay of Pigs) to over-
throw its governments" and in the 1950s and 1960s France and the
United States attempted militarily to overthrow the government of the
241. Id. art. 98.
242. 1986 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 264 (1986).
243. CODE, supra note 2, art. 72.
244. Id. art. 74.
245. Id. art. 73.
246. M. HOOKER, supra note 4, at 74-75.
247. See B. WILLIAMS, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1917-1921 67 (1987). See generally
D. G YER, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (1987).
248. See generally T. HIGGINS, THE PERFECT FAILURE: KENNEDY, EISENHOWER AND THE
C.I.A. (1987).
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Democratic Republic of Viet Nam." 9
The S.R.V. Code's provisions on crimes against the state are a
product of that history, particularly as that history relates to Viet Nam
itself:
Offenses against State security still occur due to the multi-fac-
eted sabotage plots and actions of the external enemy, and the
attempts of the class enemy and the reactionaries within the
country to rear their heads. The Penal Code severely punishes
crimes that are especially dangerous violations of State security
(i.e. counter-revolutionary crimes) because they violate the
country's independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial in-
tegrity, and threaten the very existence of our State and the
socialist regime. 5 0
Phan Hien characterizes Vietnam's contemporary situation as involv-
ing external and domestic danger of subversion:
Our country is in an exceptional situation. Though in a state of
peace, we must confront trench war in many areas, led by Chi-
nese expansionism and hegemonism in collusion with American
imperialism and other reactionary forces. At the same time, we
must keep ourselves ready to face the possibility of an aggres-
sive war of great scope. Reactionaries inside the country as well
are planning to take up their activities once again.
5 1
A number of trials in the 1980s have involved charges of conspiring
with external enemies (China or Thailand) to commit sabotage or to
plan overthrow of the government. " '
The S.R.V. Code includes among offenses against the state "propa-
ganda against the socialist regime," defined as "propaganda denigrat-
ing the socialist regime" or "production, possession, or distribution of
documents or cultural articles whose content is directed against the so-
cialist system." Both must be done "with intent to oppose people's
power"2" Amnesty International has criticized the Code for providing
249. See generally G. KOLKO, ANATOMY OF A WAR: VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES, AND
THE MODERN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE (1987); N. HANNAN, THE KEY To FAILURE: LAOS &
VIETNAM (1987); C. WHIPPLE, THE WAR IN VIETNAM: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HOW THE U.S.
BECAME INVOLVED IN VIETNAM (1967).
250. Hien, supra note 34, at 5.
251. Hien, supra note 35, at 21.
252. A Spy Ring Organized by China and Thai Army Intelligence Uncovered, VIET-
NAM COURIER, no. 2, at 12 (1985). This recounts the trial and conviction of a group in Ho
Chi Minh City in Dec. 1984 on charges of having worked with Chinese and Thai officials
in organizing others to infiltrate into Viet Nam and commit sabotage. Id.
253. CODE, supra note 2, art. 82, para. 1(a).
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imprisonment of people "for peacefully exercising their fundamental
human rights," an apparent reference to this article
s. 2 5
This provision is similar to provisions in other socialist penal
codes. For example, the Soviet codes prohibit "agitation or propa-
ganda, done to undermine or weaken Soviet authority; s25  the Cuban
Code prohibits "incite[ment] against the social order . . . by oral or
written propaganda or in any other form;" 256 the Czechoslovakian Code
prohibits "incite[ment] to revolt against the Republic" if done from a
"hostile attitude to the people's democratic system; 2 57 and the Ger-
man Democratic Republic Code prohibits "incite[ment] against
worker-peasant authority. s2 5  These provisions, acknowledged by so-
cialist jurists to infringe rights of expression, are justified by the inter-
nal and external threats to the socialist order.
Flight abroad with intent to oppose people's power is punishable
as a crime against the state. 9 This provision does not further define
the element of intent to oppose people's power. A comparable provi-
sion in the Soviet codes punishes flight abroad if done with intent to
damage the independence of the state, the territorial integrity, or mili-
tary power of the state.2 6 0 Intent to damage may be manifested by re-
questing political asylum in a capitalist state, by revealing state secrets
to another state, or by working abroad in anti-Soviet organizations.
2 61
These S.R.V. and Soviet provisions do not punish flight abroad for the
sole purpose of taking up residence abroad.26 2 The S.R.V. provision dif-
fers from the Soviet provisions in that the latter include this offense
within treason and punish it by death.26 3 The S.R.V. provision is a sep-
arate code section; the offense carries twenty years maximum impris-
onment or life imprisonment if serious consequences result.
254. 1986 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 265.
255. See, e.g., UK RSFSR art. 70.
256. CODIGO PENAL [COD. PEN.] art. 108 (Cuba 1979).
257. CZECH. PENAL CODE art. 81.
258. G.D.R. Law on Additions to the Criminal Code, Dec. 11, 1957, art. 19; see also
Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] art. 90a (W. Ger.) ("whoever publicly ... insults or maliciously
maligns the Federal Republic of Germany... shall be punished by up to three years of
imprisonment .
259. CODE, supra note 2, art. 85.
260. UK RSFSR art. 64.
261. V. KURLIANSKII & M. MIKHAILOV, OSOBO OPASNYE GOSUDARSTVENNYE PRESTU
PLENIIA [Especially Dangerous Crimes Against the State] 85 (1963).
262. Emigration does require government permission, however. Exit for emigration
without permission is punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment. CODE,
supra note 2, art. 89.
263. UK RSFSR art. 64.
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IX. OFFENSES RELATED TO THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY
The most distinctively socialist aspect of the S.R.V. Code is its
provisions protecting the state-run economy. Like other socialist codes,
it treats infringements on state property separately from and more se-
riously than infringements on personally owned property; it punishes a
variety of offenses involving mismanagement within the state-run
economy; and it punishes abuse of power by officials.
A. Offenses Related to State-Owned Property
Similar to other socialist codes, the S.R.V. Code contains separate
chapters dealing, respectively, with offenses threatening property in
the socialized sector, and offenses threatening personally-owned prop-
erty." The offenses defined in Chapter Four, "Offenses Threatening
Socialist Property," and in Chapter Six, "Offenses Threatening the
Property of Citizens," are similar. The principal difference is that pen-
alties for offenses involving state property are more severe. For exam-
ple, theft of socialist property carries five years maximum imprison-
ment,"6 whereas theft of a citizen's property carries three years
maximum.2 6 6 If the offense is committed under "particularly serious
circumstances," twenty years maximum imprisonment is provided in
the case of property of citizens, " 7 and twenty years or death in the
case of socialist property.
26 8
Theft by force (robbery) of socialist property carries fifteen years
maximum imprisonment, and twenty years or death under defined ag-
gravating circumstances. " Theft by force (robbery) of a citizen's prop-
erty carries ten years maximum imprisonment, and twenty years or
death under the same aggravating circumstances.2 70 The aggravating
circumstances are: commission by an organized group; use of weapons;
infliction of serious injury or death; appropriation of items of great
value; causing of serious consequences; and commission by a dangerous
recidivist.
2 71
Intentional damaging of socialist property carries seven years max-
264. A few socialist codes treat offenses against socialist property in the same chapter
with offenses against personal property. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 92. For a recitation
of the specific offenses defined in socialist codes relating to socialist property, see J. VEGA
VEGA, LA PRoTEccIN JURIDICO-PENAL EN EL SOCIALISMO 214-37 (1983).
265. CODE, supra note 2, art. 132.
266. Id. art. 155.
267. Id.
268. Id. art. 132.
269. Id. art. 129.
270. Id. art. 151.
271. Id. arts. 129, 151.
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imum imprisonment,272 whereas intentional damaging of the property
of citizens carries five years maximum imprisonment.2 73 "If the offense
is committed under particularly serious circumstances," the penalty as
regards the property of citizens is twenty years maximum imprison-
ment,27 4 whereas the penalty as regards socialist property is twenty
years maximum imprisonment or death.
2 75
Swindling of socialist property carries five years maximum impris-
onment, and, if done under "particularly serious circumstances," life
imprisonment.27 6 Swindling of a citizen's property carries three years
maximum imprisonment, and fifteen years if done under "particularly
serious circumstances. "277
Embezzlement of socialist property, for which there is no compa-
rable offense involving property of a citizen, carries seven years maxi-
mum imprisonment, which is increased to twenty years or death if
committed "under particularly serious circumstances.
2 78
The S.R.V. Code contains no provision comparable to the Soviet
code provisions that call for the death penalty for theft, theft by force,
embezzlement, or theft by fraud of state property "in particularly large
amounts, 27 '9 but presumably large amounts would make the circum-
stances "particularly serious."
The strict treatment of offenses involving socialist property is ex-
plained by Phan Hien:
We are building socialism beginning from an economy of small-
size production which, moreover, has undergone the devastat-
ing effects of long wars. That is why socialist property needs
strict protection. Chapter Four includes penalties appropriate
to such offenses as appropriation by force, embezzlement, theft
of socialist goods, all of which may be punished by the death
penalty; swindling of socialist goods is, moreover, punished by
life imprisonment.
2 0
Viet Nam in this regard is at the stage in which the USSR found itself
in the 1930s, when rapid socialization met with resistance, and severe
criminal penalties were used to combat that resistance.
272. Id. art. 138.
273. Id. art. 160.
274. Id.
275. Id. art. 138.
276. Id. art. 134.
277. Id. art. 157.
278. Id. art. 133.
279. UK RSFSR art. 93.
280. Hien, supra note 35, at 22.
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Theft and other unlawful acquisition of socialist property causes,
in a socialist economy, damage to the system of economic planning. In
that way, it represents a harm greater than that involved in an unlaw-
ful taking of a citizen's property. A Soviet scholar explains that
through theft the state loses items "intended for use in the economy to
create the material-technical base for communism." ' It has also been
stated: "social property to the means of production is the economic
base of the socialist system, the source of the well-being of the
people." 82
Furthermore, the need for criminal repression may be greater in
the case of socialist property. Even discounting situations of opposition
to socialization, a prospective thief reluctant to steal from an individ-
ual may have less inhibition about stealing from a state-owned enter-
prise. First, the goods may be more available as a result of being less
well guarded. Second, the taking of state property causes no direct in-
jury to an individual, as the loss is spread through the society; thus,
moral qualms about theft may be less troubling. Third, the state is
more likely to be in possession of items that are marketable.
B. Non-Theft Offenses Involving the Socialist Economy
In addition to protecting socialist property, the S.R.V. Code pun-
ishes acts that threaten the state's role in the economy. These provi-
sions are contained in Chapter Seven, "Offenses in the Economic
Field," and are comparable to similar provisions in other socialist
codes.
Typical of socialist codes is a prohibition against "illegal specula-
tion," defined as purchasing goods "with the intention of reselling
them to make a profit. ' 28 3 The S.R.V. provision carries a heavier pen-
alty than the comparable Soviet provision. Whereas the Russian Re-
public penalty is two years maximum imprisonment, and seven years if
in large quantities, 84 the S.R.V. penalty is five years, but twelve years
under certain defined aggravating circumstances, and twenty years or
life imprisonment "in particularly serious cases." The severity of this
sanction reflects the fact that Viet Nam is embarking on socialization
of commerce. Particularly in the south, with its strong tradition of pri-
281. H. KRIGER, BOR'BA s KHISHCHENIIAMI SOrSIALISTICHESKOGO IMUSHCHESTVA [The
Struggle Against Theft of Socialist Property] 4 (1965).
282. 1. ANDRaaV, supra note 22, at 90.
283. CODE, supra note 2, art. 165; see also I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 95; J. VEGA
VEGA, supra note 264, at 127-28.
284. UK RSFSR art. 154.
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vate commerce, the state has difficulty in asserting its role to the exclu-
sion of private traders.
Like other socialist codes, the S.R.V. Code makes it an offense for
an official in the socialized sector who is responsible for product qual-
ity to release into circulation products of poor quality.2 85 The act must
be done "for personal gain," it must be done either several times or
with a large quantity of products, and it must cause "serious conse-
quences."2 6 Maximum incarceration is three years for this offense.28
Conducting a prohibited industrial or commercial activity is pun-
ishable by either two years maximum imprisonment or seven years im-
prisonment if the person used state facilities or the name of an organi-
zation that does not exist, or conducted the activity on a large scale.288
Addressing a problem found in other socialist states, the Code
makes it an offense for management personnel to give false information
to superior organizations with respect to fulfillment of economic plan
targets. The maximum punishment for the offense is three years
imprisonment. 88
The Code also punishes violation of the system of distribution in
the socialized sector. It is an offense to violate the principles, policy, or
system of distribution of materials, grains, food products, or other
goods, causing serious consequences. This offense is aimed at diversion
of goods in the state sector to destinations other than those stipulated
by economic plans. The maximum penalty for this offense is three
years imprisonment.8 0
This provision has no analogue in the Soviet codes. Neither does a
broad provision that makes it an offense to "destroy or dispense goods
or commit any other act impeding the carrying out of state regulations
on socialist transformation." The maximum term of incarceration is
three years, but it is raised to seven years if done by an official in abuse
of power, or if done so as to cause serious consequences.291
Professor Nguyen Ngoc Minh describes the context of Chapter
Seven by stating that in the Vietnamese economy, particularly in the
south, "crime has reached disturbing proportions. '29 2 He says that
these problems result "from the fact that Viet Nam is progressing di-
285. CODE, supra note 2, art. 177; see also J. VEGA VEGA, supra note 264, at 125-26; I.
ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 94.
286. CODE, supra note 2, art. 177.
287. Id.
288. Id. art. 168.
289. CODE, supra note 2, art. 176; see also J. VEGA VEGA, supra note 264, at 112-16.
290. CODE, supra note 2, art. 178.
291. Id. art. 164.
292. Minh, supra note 44, at 60.
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rectly from a country of small production to socialism, without passing
through the stage of capitalist development." '
Phan Hien explains Chapter Seven by reference to the govern-
ment's effort to socialize the economy:
We are now in the first stage of the period of socialist transfor-
mation. The struggle between the two paths-the socialist path
and the capitalist path-is being pursued hard and intensely.
The enemy is undertaking, against us, sabotage of all kinds,
particularly in the economic field. The Penal Code leads a reso-
lute and vigorous struggle against sabotage. It severely pun-
ishes speculators, traffickers, manufacturers of counterfeit mer-
chandise, those who conduct commerce or hoard prohibited
merchandise, those who provoke disorder in the socialist
market.2 94
C. Crimes by Officials
Chapter Nine of the Code, "Offenses Relative to Public Func-
tions," covers acts by all types of officials but, in the socialist context,
has particular relevance to officials in economic posts. "Any person
who, through lack of responsibility, does not complete or improperly
completes an entrusted task, thereby causing serious consequences" is
subject to a maximum three years imprisonment.29 5 Abuse of power or
exceeding of power by an official, if harm results to the state, society,
or citizens, is subject to a maximum five years imprisonment.2 96 Giving
or receiving a bribe is punished by a range of maximum terms of years,
depending on the circumstances, with possible life imprisonment in
"particularly serious cases." '297 In regard to this Chapter, Phan Hien
refers to the government's policy of promoting "the right of collective
mastery of the people" and its struggle against "those who profit from
their public functions and power to oppress people." This policy, he
states, explains the serious penalties found in Chapter Nine.29 8
293. Id.
294. Hien, supra note 35, at 22-23.
295. CODE, supra note 2, art. 220; cf. UK RSFSR art. 172; see also I. ANDREEV, supra
note 22, at 94-95; J. VEGA VEGA, supra note 264, at 106-11.
296. CODE, supra note 2, art. 221; cf. UK RSFSR art. 171.
297. CODE, supra note 2, arts. 226 (receiving a bribe), 227 (giving a bribe).
298. Hien, supra note 35, at 23.
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X. OTHER OFFENSES
While the S.R.V. Code provides broad criminal liability in certain
provisions, particularly as regards acts impeding socialist reforms, it is
in many respects cautious in use of the criminal sanction. 9' It has few
"victimless" offenses, and it provides no liability for corporations or
other legal persons.300 In addition, it requires proof of mens rea for all
offenses, permitting no strict liability.
30 1
The Code's chapter on offenses against the person is unexcep-
tional. 02 A chapter on offenses involving the family penalizes bigamy,
incest, mistreatment of parents, inciting minors to commit crimes,
child stealing, arranging child marriage, and compulsion of a person to
marry. There is no prohibition relating to abortion or homosexual
acts.
3 0 3
A chapter on public safety punishes violation of environmental
regulations;304 the causing of serious consequences in exercising the
profession of a diviner or medium or following other forms of supersti-
tion;3 0 participation in games of chance; 06 receiving stolen goods;
307
promoting prostitution (this does not include engaging in prostitu-
tion);308 and promoting the use of illicit drugs (this does not include
possession or use of drugs).30' The fact that engaging in prostitution
and drug possession are not considered offenses is consistent with ap-
proaches in other socialist states which view those who engage in pros-
titution or use drugs as victims rather than criminals. Treatment and
299. Reduction in the number of offenses is a feature of socialist penal codes of the
1960s. Horvath, supra note 40, at 36.
300. Dierdy, Ucheniie o vine v sotsialisticheskom ugolovnom prave [Study of Guilt
in Socialist Criminal Law], in SOVREMENNYE TENDENTSH RAZVrrnA SOTSIALISTICHESKOGO
UGOLOVNOGO PRAVA [Contemporary Tendencies in the Development of Socialist Criminal
Law] 40, 41 (V. Kudriavtsev ed. 1983).
301. CODE, supra note 2, arts. 9-10; see also Dierdy, supra note 300, at 41 (on rejec-
tion of strict liability in socialist codes), and especially at 47 (even negligence requires
proof of mens rea); I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 70 (rejection of strict liability in social-
ist codes seen as protection against unjustified repression).
302. CODE, supra note 2, ch. 2, arts. 101-18, "Crimes Against the Life, Health, Dig-
nity, and Honor of the Person."
303. Id. ch. 5, arts. 143-150, "Crimes Against Marriage and the Family and Crimes
Against Minors;" see also J. VEGA VEGA, supra note 264, at 133, 213 (most socialist codes
omit a prohibition of homosexual acts); id. at 143-45 (most prohibit performance of abor-
tions under medically dangerous circumstances but permit performance in hospitals).
304. CODE, supra note 2, art. 195.
305. Id. art. 199.
306. Id. art. 200.
307. Id. art. 201.
308. Id. art. 202.
309. Id. art. 203.
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job training has been instituted for drug addicts and former
prostitutes.3 10
A chapter on public security includes a broadly phrased distur-
bance of the peace offense-"provok[ing] trouble in a public
place"-punishable by two years maximum imprisonment."' There is
no penalty comparable to that in some socialist penal codes prohibiting
failure to engage in socially productive labor ("parasitism").
312
A chapter devoted to offenses against citizen rights13 punishes un-
lawful arrest;314 unlawful firing of a worker;1 ' and violation of domi-
cile,310 of secrecy of correspondence or communication,"1 7 or voting
rights, 18 of freedom of assembly and religion, '3 1 of women's right of
equality,32 0 of authors' and investors' rights, 2' and of the right of citi-
zens to petition the government for redress of grievances. ' The Code
omits a provision found in Soviet and a few other socialist codes that
penalizes violation of regulations on separation of church and state.
32 3
Another chapter that deals in part with citizen rights is Chapter
Ten, "Offenses Threatening Judicial Activity."'" It is an offense for a
310. Interview by author with Nguyen Thanh Long, Vice-Chair, People's Committee,
Quang Nam Da Nang Province, and member of the National Assembly, in Da Nang, Viet
Nam, Dec. 7, 1978. The author visited a rehabilitation school for recovering drug addicts
in Ho Chi Minh City. See Can, supra note 146, at 25-26 (discussion on rehabilitation of
drug addicts); see also Paringaux, supra note 144 (discussion of on the job training for
ex-prostitutes).
According to former R.V.N. Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Oanh, who heads
an economic planning agency in the Ho Chi Minh City administration, the policies have
"removed the ugly side of the old Saigon, the mass prostitution, drug addiction and
gangsterism." SOUTH, Oct. 1987, at 9.
311. CODE, supra note 2, art. 198; see also I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 105-06; J.
VEGA VEGA, supra note 264, at 209-12.
312. I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 106-07.
313. CODE, supra note 2, ch. 3, arts. 119-128, "Crimes Against Citizens' Rights of
Freedom and Democracy;" see also VirTNAM CONST., ch. 5, "Basic Rights and Obligations
of Citizens" (lists the rights whose violation is prohibited by these articles); UK RSFSR,
ch. 4, arts. 132-143, "Crimes Against the Political and Labor Rights of Citizens" (an
example of a comparable chapter in a Soviet penal code that prohibits violations of citi-
zens' rights).
314. CODE, supra note 2, art. 119.
315. Id. art. 123.
316. Id. art. 120.
317. Id. art. 121.
318. Id. art. 122.
319. Id. art. 124.
320. Id. art. 125.
321. Id. art. 126.
322. Id. art. 127.
323. UK RSFSR art. 142; see also I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at 113-117.
324. CODE, supra note 2, arts. 230-248.
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prosecuting officer or investigating magistrate to try to convict a per-
son known to them to be innocent,""' for a trial judge or lay assessor
intentionally to render an unlawful judgment,826 or for an official to
pressure a judge to make an illegal decision.82" 7 This chapter punishes
use of torture in criminal investigations,8" pressuring a witness in a
criminal investigation to make false statements,8 29 and alteration of a
dossier in a criminal case by an investigating magistrate, prosecuting
officer, magistrate, lay assessor or other judicial officer, or defense
lawyer."
Chapter Ten also punishes certain acts by officials in charge of de-
tainees: negligence resulting in escape;8 ' unlawful release of a person
in custody;8 2 and refusal to release a person for whom there is no fur-
ther basis for detention.8 8 It also punishes acts violating the judicial
process: refusal to carry out a court order;8 4 knowing falsification by a
court translator or expert witness;8 5 refusal to give an opinion as an
expert witness;8 6 and encouraging a witness to lie. 37 Furthermore, it
punishes the taking or destruction of items being used as evidence;ss 8
concealment of certain enumerated serious offenses; 8 9 and failure to
report certain enumerated serious offenses. °
Like other socialist codes, the S.R.V. Code includes a chapter de-
fining offenses by military personnel,3' including refusal to obey an
order,84 2 absence without leave,
s" and mistreatment of prisoners.,
4
Another chapter punishes war-related offenses that violate inter-
325. Id. art. 231.
326. See id. art. 232.
327. See id. art. 233.
328. See id. art. 234.
329. See id. art. 235.
330. See id. art. 236.
331. See id. art. 237.
332. See id. art. 238.
333. See id. art. 239.
334. See id. art. 240.
335. See id. art. 241.
336. See id. art. 242.
337. See id. art. 243.
338. See id. art. 244.
339. See id. art. 246.
340. See id. art. 247.
341. See id. ch. 11, arts. 249-276, "Criminal Responsibility of Military Personnel for
Failure to Fulfill Their Duties and Responsibilities;" see also I. ANDREEV, supra note 22,
at 43.
342. CODE, supra note 2, art. 250.
343. See id. art. 261.
344. See id. art. 275.
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national law:34 5 waging a war of aggression;3' 6 mass killing of persons
(crimes against humanity); 4" using unlawful methods of waging war;388
and recruiting or acting as a mercenary.85 9 All of these offenses, except
for acting as a mercenary, carry a possible death penalty.
XI. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CODE
Adoption of the 1985 Code places Viet Nam squarely within the
socialist family of law in penal matters. But the Code reflects original
approaches. The General Part closely follows those of other socialist
codes. The Special Part follows that same pattern in structure and in
much of its content, but the decision as to which acts are offenses, as
well as the penalty structure, indicate consideration of the needs of
Viet Nam.
The impact on the Code of Viet Nam's stormy history is strong.
Contemporary socialist reform and Viet Nam's long years of war have
left their mark on it. Adoption of the Code moves Vietnamese penal
law from a formative stage to one of consolidation of the experimenta-
tion of the early years of socialist reform.
Just as the Code has been shaped by these events, so will later
events determine its future. The extent to which severe penalties will
be employed will be determined by the course of socialist reform and
the degree of social conflict it generates. It will also be determined by
the government's concern over Viet Nam's external situation, particu-
larly its relations with China; so long as that tension continues, the
government will find speech and action directed against it to be highly
dangerous. The impact of disruptive factors related to the war will di-
minish over time, leading to a more stable society that presumably will
require less use of criminal punishment for social ordering. As time
passes, the attitudes towards law that developed as a result of Con-
fucianism and colonialism will change.
The long-term prospect is for moderation. As Viet Nam becomes
more stable, its penal policy will rely more on rehabilitation and less
on severity of sanction.
345. See id. ch. 12, arts. 277-280, "Crimes Against Peace and Humanity and War
Crimes." On similar offenses in other socialist codes, see I. ANDREEV, supra note 22, at
117-20.
346. CODE, supra note 2, art. 277.
347. See id. art. 278.
348. See id. art. 279.
349. See id. art. 280.
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